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Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov has reshaped Chechen society to his ideal image. After 
two wars that made the city a living hell and an insurgency that was not cleared until the 
beginning of the last decade, Putin’s policy of Chechenisation that started in 2000 with the late 
Akmad-Hadji, has started to resemble a perceived peace. This peace provided the region’s 
inhabitants a sense of security and produces world-class sport fighters, catapulting young 
Chechen men and sometimes women up the social ladder. Despite the human-rights violations 
and accusations of funneling fighters to employment in the local armed forces, Kadyrov has been 
able to shape the image of the ideal Chechen man and simultaneously, reaffirm his power with a 
slogan, Akhmat-Sila. This slogan be heard in various mediums to the point of proliferation. This 
thesis will use a historical-digital ethnographic approach with a theoretical framework of nation 
branding to explain the shifts in Chechen identity and the slogan Akhmat-Sila, providing a 
background on how Chechen warrior culture and the patronage that gives the slogan agency 
now. The slogan will be examined on Instagram and supporting media sources. Chapter 1 dives 
into the Caucasus imaginary and history of Tsarist Russia, leading into the two Chechen Wars 
and years after. Chapter 2 will expand on current research of Ramzan Kadyrov and his social 
media use, parsing out themes found in his Instagram account. Chapter 3 will focus on the 
theoretical framework that will support the qualitative approach for the phenomenon of the 
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Introduction: How I Became Interested in Chechnya 
 
“Akhmat Sila!”1 This notorious slogan can be heard across the training halls at Akhmat 
Fight Clubs across Chechnya. Young men tussle across the mats, throwing precise hits that could 
knock a person’s soul out of their body followed by bone-crunching arm bars. Ambitious young 
Chechens hope to earn a spot in Ramzan Kadyrov’s top cadre of fighters and achieve a type of 
social mobility that until recently, was unheard of in the region.2 Maybe Dagestani UFC fighter 
Khabib Nurmagomedov’s success and his Caucasus identification with the papakha in the 
octagon helped spur Akhmat Fight Club memberships across the North Caucasus. 
 But the reasons for fight club membership growth are more profound than fame. There is 
a long standing martial tradition that has existed for centuries in the North Caucasus.3 This 
warrior culture has been used in the creation of a unique Chechen National Brand—one that is 
used for international recognition, supported through repeated utterance, and meaningful to those 
who partake in it. Kadyrov’s slogan is indexical of the modern Chechen identity that has deep 
roots in local historical narratives. Bryant Gumbel shines a light on this warrior culture while 
interviewing Kadyrov. Kadyrov uses a comparison to demonstrate his point, “ While a Jewish 
parent might say to their child you’ll be a professor or a scientist. Here our parents say, he’s 
going to be a warrior.”4 
                                               
1 Zidan, Karim. “UFC Champ Kamaru Usman Visits Chechen Dictator Ramzan Kadyrov’s MMA Fight Club.” 
Bloody Elbow, November 26, 2020. https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2020/11/26/21721674/ufc-champ-kamaru-
usman-chechen-dictator-ramzan-kadyrovs-mma-fight-club-politics. 
2 NPR. “Chechen Leader’s MMA Empire: A Tool For Propaganda And More.” NPR.org, July 31, 2017. 
https://www.npr.org/2017/07/31/540652582/chechen-leaders-mma-empire-a-tool-for-propaganda-and-more. 
3 Raimondi, Marc. “Inside the Hat That Helped Shape Khabib’s Identity.” ESPN.com, September 4, 2019. 
https://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/27536389/ufc-254-hat-helped-shape-khabib-nurmagomedov-identity. 





Before delving further into my thesis, I will speak of how I noticed this Chechen 
strongman and later, his proliferating slogan. I first noticed the notorious Instagram celebrity, 
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, in the middle of 2016. While scrolling on Instagram looking 
at a wide array of cat photos, I came across an Instagram post of a man who lost his cat. I then 
read further into the post and did a basic google search. At this point, I realized who this man 
with the lost cat was in the world. Ramzan Kadyrov, not yet kicked out of American social 
media by the Magnitsky Act, was quite prevalent on Instagram. Kadyrov, having an estimated 
“1.8 million followers,” at the time, hopelessly declared that, “We have completely lost our 
cat.”5 Feeling Kadyrov’s pain of searching for a family pet, I climbed further down the rabbit 
hole of social media to see if he eventually found this cat. After a few minutes, I found more 
commentary on Kadyrov. Last Week Tonight host John Oliver was pulling Kadyrov’s leg in 
many ways, including the creation of a hashtag “#findkadyrovscat” that yielded hundreds of cat 
photos worldwide. Oliver then states that "Kadyrov is basically like a can of Monster energy 
drink come to life," and “…honestly, I cannot recommend his Instagram feed enough."6 
John Oliver’s recommendation was not in vain, and I immediately started to follow 
Kadyrov when he still had access to his official personal account, @Kadyrov_95. Never in my 
life had I ever seen such an eclectic character, much less the photos of performance by a 
supposed warlord; Kadyrov could be seen wrestling an alligator, holding a baby tiger, working 
out at a high intensity, sparring with his friends, meeting with local muftis and clerics, shooting 
automatic weapons, and posing with ordinary Chechens on his personal Instagram account. After 
examining Kadyrov’s Instagram, there was no doubt why he was so popular—he was similar to a 
                                               
5 Kennedy, Merritt. “When The Cat’s Away: Chechen Strongman Spars With John Oliver Over Lost Feline.” 
NPR.org, May 25, 2016. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/05/25/479441645/when-the-cats-away-
chechen-strongman-spars-with-john-oliver-over-lost-feline 




more reserved version of Dan Bilzerian, an Armenian-American Instagram celebrity larger than 
life.7  However, Oliver emphasizes the importance of finding Kadyrov’s cat, stating "For the 
good of the Chechen people and stability in the whole region, we have to find this f*****'s cat."8  
The fact that a warlord is torn by the departure of his feline piqued my interest. What 
John Oliver ominously stated about Chechen stability lying totally on Kadyrov’s shoulders 
brought me to formulate a few questions: Why does Chechen stability all rely on Ramzan 
Kadyrov, and what factors put him into his position as head of the Chechen Republic? Why is he 
so important for the region and to Russia? Why is he so popular on Instagram? These curiosities 
attached themselves to my interests filed in my mental library for later academic use that I 
carried with me after I left the U.S. Navy in May 2017.  
During my undergraduate years, I learned Russian history and culture with an emphasis 
on Chechen history and the tumultuous events the region endured the previous thirty years. 
These events consisted of a separatist movement, two full scale wars that leveled Grozny, a 
decade-long jihadi insurgency, international human rights violations, and an energetic strongman 
who currently rules the region as his “private fiefdom.”9 Recent Chechen history is inseparable 
from the Kadyrov family’s ascent to power. After December 20th 2017, Kadyrov was blocked 
from all US-owned social media10 platforms under the Magnitsky Act for “human rights 
violations.”11 Kadyrov’s followers were so upset, the only present NGO in the region, Memorial 
                                               
7 Bilzerian, Dan. “Dan Bilzerian’s (@danbilzerian) Profile on Instagram • 1,361 Posts.” Social Media. 
Instagram.com. Accessed December 9, 2020. https://www.instagram.com/danbilzerian/. 
8 Kennedy, Chechen Strongman Spars With John Oliver, Website. 
9 Lokshina, Tanya. “Dispatches: The Price of Dissent in Chechnya.” Human Rights Watch, April 13, 2016. 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/13/dispatches-price-dissent-chechnya. 
10 The platforms included at the time were Instagram, Facebook, Snapchat, and Twitter. However, Kadyrov’s 
influence was mainly on Instagram.  
11 Eckel, Mike. “U.S. Sanctions Chechen Leader Kadyrov, Four Others Under Magnitsky Act.” 





in neighboring Ingushetia, was “torched by masked men.”12 Memorial’s Oleg Orlov explains 
why the event happened, “We were held responsible for this by Kadyrov and his inner circle 
because we are one of the very few sources of information about rights abuses in Chechnya,” 
which contributed to breaking the silence on Kadyrov’s abuses.13 Regardless of the notoriety 
surrounding Kadyrov, he has continued to be on my radar over the years. I continued to follow 
the development of the Chechen Instagram sphere online. One area that I noticed during my first 
semester of my graduate program was the use of the slogan, “Akhmat-Sila” by Kadyrov’s 
government and supporters.14 
  The slogan commemorates Ramzan Kadyrov’s late father, Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov. 
Akhmad-Hadji was the original Kremlin-appointed Chechen leader until his assassination at the 
FC Terek Dinamo Football Stadium in Grozny in May 2004.15 The exact birth of the term 
“Akhmat-Sila” is not yet clear, but it can be assumed that it came to be during the last year of 
Kadyrov’s official Instagram account in 2017, before the Magnitsky Act brought him under U.S. 
sanctions, thus closing his account to 3 million followers. The term may also have sprouted out 
of his Akhmat Fight Club, with the earliest video of the facility dating back to 2015 and the 
earliest comment posting “Ахмат сила” dating back to 2017, showing fighters clothed in fight 
club apparel, some with the elder Kadyrov’s face stamped on the front.16  
 In 2020, Akmat-Sila is not only a slogan for all Chechens who side with Kadyrov, but a 
term used to encompass all parts of an ideal Chechen identity. The slogan seems to be indexical 
                                               
12 Bennetts, Marc. “Chechen Leader’s Instagram Closure ‘Led to Revenge Attacks’ on NGO.” The Guardian, 
January 21, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/21/chechen-leaders-instagram-closure-led-to-
revenge-attacks-on-ngo 
13 Bennetts, Chechen Leader’s Instagram Closure, Website.  
14 In Russian: Ахмат-Сила 
15 Mirumyan, Karine. “Analysis: How Chechen Leader Builds His Father’s Personality Cult – BBC Monitoring.” 
https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, June 6, 2019. https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200v0oc 
16 This page was recently closed due to December 2020 U.S. sanctions: Fight Club Akhmat. Рамзан Кадыров 




of belonging to a social circle within Chechnya that identifies with the Kadyrov regime, its 
fighters, security forces and the social mobility that comes with it. The phenomenon of the term 
can be seen overtly on clothing, art designs, buildings, a music video, Instagram videos, combat-
sport battle cries, apparel, news broadcasts, local military training facilities, and sometimes, in 
the local Sufi Islam. The term warrants a deeper examination of its origins and significance, one 
that takes place not only in the physical, but the digital space of social networks and supporting 
online resources. My thesis will not try to solve any pertinent questions outright, but to expand 
on the topic of the evolving Chechen identity and how Ramzan Kadyrov has branded the modern 
identity to his ideal of Checheness and all that it encompasses.17  
Simply, the proliferation of Akhmat-Sila on everything in Chechnya is too noticeable not 
to discuss. The slogan seems to be a reinforcement of the Kadyrov regime. The slogan seems to 
serve as an indication of regime support and an approval for all its actions. The slogan seems to 
convey social mobility and honor by Kadyrov’s club fighters and local armed units. The slogan 
is not restricted only to Chechnya, but to anyone Kadyrov sponsors, patronizes, or supports 
internationally. Religiously, the slogan attempts to mutate traditional teachings into Kadyrov’s 
personalized rituals, often memorializing his late father Akhmad-Hadji as a saint. The slogan 
happens to lean pro-Russian, meaning that it does not carry the original ideal of Chechen 
freedom seen in Russian literature or in the First Chechen War. Digitally, the slogan serves 
Kadyrov’s motive of recognition by spreading like wildfire through constant recirculation, 
utterances, hashtags, and merchandise branding. In addition, Akhmat-Sila synthesizes with other 
known Chechen indexical signs, often indicating more ominous aspects of online control.   
                                               
17 Avedissian, Karena. “Clerics, Weightlifters, and Politicians: Ramzan Kadyrov’s Instagram as an Official Project 





Chapter 1 will discuss the formation of Chechen Identity in Russian literature and 
through the lives of a few prominent Chechen figures with a Russian Counter-figure to give 
context to the Russian-Chechen relationship, leading to Ramzan Kadyrov’s power today after the 
Chechen Wars. Chapter 2 will traverse the recent literature of Kadyrov and his influence/social 
media use in contemporary Chechnya. Chapter 3 will explain the theoretical framework used to 
explicate the slogan Akhmat-Sila and its importance for the Kadyrov regime along with ethical 
concerns in the digital sphere. Chapter 4 will narrate the research through the themes of 
Kadyrov’s slogan in pre and post-sanctions postings, fight club prize fighters, on infrastructure, 
and in the Chechen armed forces. The conclusion will wrap up the findings to attempt to tell 

















Chapter 1: Chechen Identity Construction in Literature and History 
 
Before any true scholarly research had been conducted in the North Caucasus, the 
existence of what Soviet bureaucrats coined “the small nations” came to existence in Russian 
literature through the Imperialist Russian perspective.18 Literature of the North Caucasus 
expanded during the Tsarist Russian Empire’s expansion south in the 18th century. This 
southward expansion led to the first encounters between Russians and Chechens around July 
1722 when Peter the Great went down the Volga into the Caspian sea, landing in a spot on the 
coast that he named “Petrovsk,” in what is known as Makhachkala in modern day Dagestan.19 
The encounters started when the expedition pushed inward, leading to conflicts with what we 
would call the Chechen people today. These conflicts would soon develop the strongmen figures 
of Imam Shamil for Chechens and General Alexei Yermolov for Russians in the 19th century and 
those of General Djokhar Dudayev and Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov in the 20th. The connection of 
contemporary Chechen identity and past Russian literature is imperative, because this literature 
develops the basis for the postmodern warrior myth that Ramzan Kadyrov uses to develop his 
slogan, Akhmat-Sila. 
One of the first Russian writers to form an ideation of the Caucasus in Chechnya was 
Alexander Pushkin. Pushkin’s experience influenced his work The Caucasus Prisoner, 
romanticizing the sheer natural beauty in the region and exotic wildness in the southern nations 
in the context of a Russian captive narrative of a cosmopolitan in Chechnya. In addition, Mikhail 
Lermontov was mesmerized by the region, stating, “The Caucasus mountains are sacred to me. 
And so early! At ten! Oh that mystery, that lost paradise will claw at my mind until the grave.”20 
                                               
18 Meier, Andrew. To The Heart Of A Conflict CHECHNYA. 15. New York-London: W.W. Norton, 2005. 
19 Gall, Carlotta, and Thomas De Wall. Chechnya: A Small Victorious War. 37. London, UK: Pan Books, 1997 





Lermontov also uses the region for his setting for “Bela” in The Heroes Of Our Times, a story of 
Maxim and Pechorin’s time in the Caucasus, in which Pechorin has a horse for a bride trade deal 
with Bela’s younger brother Azamat, followed by Kazbich, the victim of the misappropriation, 
coming and killing Bela’s father and mortally wounding her in revenge. Not one of the most 
endearing stories of the Gortsy,21 but for sure to etch and imagination of the southern peoples of 
Russia for years to come. 
 Leo Tolstoy’s voluntary military experience in the 1850s created the basis for the greater 
Caucasus imaginary, which led to his works The Cossacks and the fictional-realist piece Hadji 
Murad, highlighting the Chechen Rebel and his difficulties with Russians and his own people. 
Tolstoy delves into how each nation saw their own customs to explain how you cannot expect 
your own culture to be the standard, writing, ‘The dog gave meat to the ass and the ass gave hay 
to the dog, and both went hungry” and “Its own customs seem good to each nation.”22 Tolstoy’s 
cultural relativity and time in Chechnya helped explain the differences between the two cultures 
and how Russian ideals were not the same as Chechen ideals and vice-versa. Tolstoy’s presence 
in the North Caucasus is still reveled, with funds from the Kadyrov Foundation going towards 
the Leo Tolstoy museum renovations in Chechnya.23 Tolstoy’s descendants believe that without 
his sojourn in Chechnya, many of his greatest works would have never emerged: 
 For Leo Tolstoy, his stay in the Caucasus was a turning point in his life and biography. It 
is not known whether such masterpieces as Hadji Murad, Cossacks and even War and 
Peace would have been created if it had not been for his stay in the Caucasus and here in 
Chechnya.24 
 
                                               
 
21 Word for mountain peoples, specifically for the Caucasus Mountain range. 
22 Tolstoy, Leo. Hadji Murad .80. Digireads.com Publishing. Kindle Edition. 
23 Kosumov, L. “Турмаршрут «по следам Льва Толстого» объявили открытым.” https://grozny.tv, December 7, 
2019. https://grozny.tv/news/tourism/35382 
24 Ibid. The original Russian: “Для Льва Толстого пребывание на Кавказе было переломным моментом его 
жизни и биографии. Неизвестно были ли бы созданы такие его шедевры как «Хаджи-Мурат», «Казаки» и 




Tolstoy’s family may be correct. Tolstoy was a factor in Russo-Chechen relations. In a Grozny 
TV interview, Tolstoy’s Great Grand-Son Vladimir Tolstoy underscored his great-grandfather’s 
significance to Chechens, “The Chechen people think that Tolstoy wrote most truthfully of the 
events that happened then and the character of the mountain peoples, their striving to be 
independent, for freedom, and their religious, ethnic and other particularities.”25 
 Although not Chechen, the younger Tolstoy’s statement of praise is very important. 
According to the Tolstoy’s descendant’s statement above, the Chechen people agreed with 
Tolstoy’s account of their way of life enough to have a museum and town renamed for him, 
Tolstoy-Yurt. Tolstoy depicted a traditional Chechen identity in literature that more or less 
renders more truth than myth. This agreed imaginary of Chechen identity coincides with the 
Tolstoy museum’s “…ethnographic mission, to depict the life of Chechens at the time when 
Tolstoy lived there.”26 Without Tolstoy’s time in the Caucasus, the Caucasus imaginary in the 
Russian literary public might be opaque at best, and some of his best works may not have been 
produced.  
Although considered outsiders, these classical Russian writers who spent time in the 
Caucasus have depicted the idea that the Chechen people are unique with their own identity, 
warrior culture, values, and centuries-old customs, known as the adat.27 This accepted outsider 
view is reaffirmed by Kadyrov’s funding to restore the Tolstoy museum, recognizing its 
ethnographic importance, and homage to the writer with Tolstoy-Yurt. This accepted view also 
brings into question of narrative formulation. Kadyrov’s funding of the Tolstoy museum 
                                               
25 Kishkovsky, Sophia. “Chechnya’s Favorite Russian: Leo Tolstoy (Published 2009).” The New York Times, 
December 28, 2009, sec. Arts. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/arts/29iht-tolstoy.html. 
26 Kishkovsky, Chechnya’s Favorite Russian, Website.  
27 The ruling customs, which often pre-date and mix in with Islam, creating a unique variation of the religion in each 




undeniably demonstrates his commitment to the pro-Russian narrative in Chechnya while 
coming off as the preserver of local history. As much as literature formulated the Caucasus 
imaginary to the Russian literary public, some critics disagree. 
In The Captive and the Gift, Bruce Grant highlights how difficult it is to get a true sense 
of the customs, traditions, and visual clarity on what the Caucasus is for the fact that there has 
been 200 years of an ingrained and debated “literary Caucasus.”28 Grant reminds us that although 
Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy all wrote about the Caucasus and highlighted specific attributes 
to the mountain cultures, the writers wrote in the Russian turned captive narrative in the context 
of Russian Imperialism which is a whole study on its own. In Allah’s Mountains, Sebastian 
Smith’s view agrees along similar lines, stating, “The Caucasus inspired some of these writers’ 
most glorious works, but ultimately, they were imperial servants, collectors of new countries.”29 
To get a better idea on how the image of Caucasians coincides with more contemporary times, 
Grant interviews former Soviet-Azeri director Rustem Ibrahimbekov on his view of the evolution 
of the Caucasian imaginary: 
If we are going to talk about the image of Caucasians, then among the most important 
will be from Tolstoy—Hadji Murad—earlier than that, Pushkin’s poetry. We can point to 
the usual characteristics—the very brave, the masculine, the vibrant Caucasian who 
belongs to a civilized world, a highly organized world driven by honor and distinction 
that is, nonetheless, not very clear [to the Russian reader] beyond these key loyalties: to 
freedom, independence, honor, and so forth. If we take the same image today, then in 
Russian cinema and literature, the Caucasian is a street trader, a bandit, dishonorable, 
cruel. We all know the picture. That is to say, over the course of approximately 150 
years, this image has been transformed monstrously [chudovishchno]. To a certain extent, 
it corresponds to reality. To a certain extent it is fair, and in other respects it is invented . . 
.30 
 
                                               
28 Grant, Bruce. The Captive and the Gift: Cultural Histories of Sovereignty in Russia and the Caucasus. 10. Cornell 
University Press, 2011. 
29 Smith, Sebastian. Allah’s Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya. New York, NY: I.B Tauris Publishers, 2001. 11.     
www.ibtauris.com.  




With Ibrahimbekov’s interview, Grant displays that the Caucasus imaginary evolves with time. 
Ibrahimbekov also acknowledges that the Russian reader sometimes cannot read into the 
complexities of the mountain cultures. Despite this, the main aspects of the imaginary are never 
exactly perceived the same, but are based on long-standing qualities of freedom, honor, 
masculinity, and clan organization. This conflict of the Caucasus imaginary influences Ramzan 
Kadyrov’s slogan Akhmat-Sila by giving a perceived identity by insiders and outsiders to build a 
base for his own branding of Chechen identity. Akhmat-Sila includes all these aspects of the 
perceived Caucasus imaginary along with his own modifications which we will see later in the 
thesis.   
General Yermolov  
 
As we have explored how Chechens and other Caucasus peoples were viewed by the 
Imperialist Russian perspective in literature, Chechens got their first true parallel view of 
Russians and their customs through General Alexei Yermolov’s military operations. A 
Napoleonic War veteran, General Yermolov was a military tyrant that burned a deep wound in 
the Chechen psyche. As Imam Shamil was for Chechens, General Yermolov proved to be the 
rallying figure for Russians. Much of the inflicted pain is carried in the Chechen oral historical 
tradition and the contradictions the Russians believed him to be, a Hero. Yermolov’s stature 
commanded authority and had a mythical aurora, in which Pushkin likened him to “the head of a 
tiger on a Herculean torso.”31 Yermolov’s presence is confirmed with a Spanish Officer’s 
description of the beefy figure, adding that “Ermolov is of an almost colossal height and very 
well formed, with a vigorous constitution and a martial attitude: these traits are very strongly 
pronounced, without being harsh; his expression is full of energy and vivacity; and his 
                                               




penetrating look reveals him to be a superior man.”32 Yermolov embodied the Imperialist 
Russian might. 
In addition to his figure, Yermolov brought war to the Gortsy and started a precedent for 
years to come, a scorched earth policy in Chechnya.33 Before Yermolov’s martial strategy 
reform, the standard operation of procedure was to wait for highlanders to come down and raid 
and then, have a defensive attack, which proved inefficient. Yermolov implemented Russian 
control aiming for dominance of the Gortsy by declaring, “I desire that the terror of my name 
should guard our frontiers more potently than chains or fortresses, that my word should be for 
the natives a law more inevitable than death.”34 Yermolov was the Russian terror that came in 
like a wrecking ball, destroying anything in his path that he deemed uncivilized in the Tsarist 
sense. He burned villages to the ground, cut down forests, built forts, in which the capital of the 
region, Grozny, was the main one.35  The tyrant general was only stopped by the Tsarist court in 
1827, when he fell out of political favor for being accused of having a “few overt connections” to 
leaders in the “Decembrist Uprising.”36 The Tsar dismissed him from his duties, leaving him to 
gripe and complain about the leadership of all the theater generals after him.  
Anatol Lieven highlights that Yermolov still brought a sense of unforgiving Russian 
mentality more than 170 years later when Russia named a Cossack unit after the general.37 In 
1995 during the first war, Lieven recalls an encounter with these Cossacks and what they said 
about Chechnya’s fate. Lieven restates the Cossacks’ sentiment, “ We will ram pork fat down 
their throats with our bayonets as the Cossacks have always done…Stalin should have finished 
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the job in 1944.”38 This statement reaffirms that Yermolov’s policies stuck to the Russian psyche 
for a dangerously long time, creating a destructive precedent in Chechnya that would create 
continuous Chechen resentments to Russian rule until the Second Chechen War.  
Imam Shamil 
 
In the 1800s, a native Dagestani, Imam Shamil was one of the first architects to plant the 
seed of nationhood for Dagestanis and Chechens alike with a “mini Islamic state.”39 Imam 
Shamil is most renowned for his duration of resistance to the Russian state, spanning 25 years of 
conflict filled with assassination attempts, lucky escapes that have become local folklore, and his 
leadership skills. Many times, Imam Shamil’s forces were plundered and pushed back, but he 
was always able to regain strength and rally enough warriors to bring the heat back to the Tsarist 
forces. In one instance, Imam Shamil was the only one left alive in the battle of Gimry in 1832, 
where his predecessor and close friend, “First Imam” of Dagestan, Kazi Mullah died. In 1834 
Imam Shamil gained his title after Kazi Mullah’s successor, Khamza Bek, was murdered and he 
was nominated by popular demand to the position.40 However, his position did not come with 
full authority.  
Only being elected by religious figures in his village, the newly minted Imam still needed 
to round up support from some of Khamza Bek’s followers and “defeating local rivals.”41 After 
asserting his authority, Shamil went on to “consolidate his power among an assortment of fellow 
Muslim leaders, some loyal to Russia and others equally resistant to Russian rule and to Shamil’s 
hegemony.”42 Imam Shamil sought to gain support not just from the people for or against the 
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Russian Empire, but the support of the Muslim world. After many years of conflict through the 
1840s and 1850s, historians often agree that Imam Shamil’s leadership and organizational 
abilities had created  “something resembling a state in the lands he controlled, a political entity 
that attracted more and more people.”43 The type of movement he created was ultimately Islamic, 
recruiting the faithful of different teips, tribes, and Sufi orders. Imam Shamil was also part of the 
Naqshbandi order of Sufism, which is in contrast with the Qadiriya order that is dominant in 
Ramzan Kadyrov’s regime today. Regardless of the order which a leader belongs to, the political 
organizations and moral codes brought in by Sufism helped create a brotherhood not on “the fact 
that they were all committed anti-Russians but that they were committed Muslims.”44 In short, 
Imam Shamil had brought many mountain groups together despite traditional Chechen adats that 
created variations of Islam in the hopes to purify the groups to collectively implement Sharia 
law.  
 Although Imam Shamil may have been one of the first strongmen with the idea of an 
independent state, he could also be seen as one of the first traitors, depending on how one 
perceives his actions at the end of his command.  On Augusts 25th, 1859, Imam Shamil finally 
saw that resistance was futile and surrendered by handing in his sword with 50 murids to Prince 
Baratinsky.45 46Afterward, Shamil was brought out to St. Petersburg, celebritized for his actions, 
and lived the rest of his life out with family in comfort out in Kaluga, just south-west of 
Moscow. Imam Shamil passed away in 1871. 
 There would be conflict between this period on up to the October Revolution in 1917, 
the Bolshevik take-over and a few skirmishes when Stalin brought collectivized agriculture to 
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the region in 1929. The 1944 deportations to Kazakhstan would be the next burn to the Chechen 
collective memory that would displace many during the latter half of World War II.47 The 
generation of Chechens born during the deportations would make up many of the prominent 
figures in the independence movement to come in the 1990s. General Dudayev, the future first-
elected President Aslan Maskhadov, and Kremlin-appointed Akmad-Hadji Kadyrov would be 
the children of the deportations to become Chechen historical figures who promoted different 
forms of Chechen identity.  
Chechen Identity in the Chechen Wars 
 
In the past three decades, scholars of Chechnya have dedicated time, bravery, and 
resources to study the Chechen Wars and Chechen identity construction, often revolving around 
traditional and Islamic values. In Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, Carlotta Gall and Thomas 
De Wall developed one of the few first-hand accounts on the ground in Chechnya during the 
First Chechen War in 1994. They developed their narrative that tells the story of war time 
Chechnya along with historical context to give a base to the separatist movement and the 
Chechen identity revival that flourished. This identity revival drove Djokhar Dudayev, a Soviet 
Airforce General, to return home in 1991 and declared Chechnya sovereign, thus “seizing 
power.”48 Ultimately, when the first Chechen war commenced in Grozny, Dudayev enunciated a 
long and deep collective identity that connects all Chechens, requiring the ancient ethos that if a 
challenge was made against a man or against a nation that rising up was obligatory stating, “This 
is a war of life or death. All our citizens must know that we have to defend our country with our 
lives.”49  
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General Djokhar Dudayev  
 
  Although not the first in Chechen memory, Djokhar Dudayev became one of many greats 
to carry the cult of personality in Chechnya. Following in the steps of historical greats such as 
Sheikh Mansur of the 18th century and Imam Shamil of the 19th, Dudayev became one of the 
great leaders to command the region in the 20th. A successful product of the Soviet system, an 
Airforce General who served in the Afghan War and a deportee as a toddler under Stalin’s order 
in 1944, Dudayev carried a lot of backing and a common collective Chechen memory of 
suffering. Since Dudayev was a product of the Soviet system, he often felt a deep longing for the 
traditions and customs of his homeland. When the fall of the Soviet Union was inevitable, 
Dudayev saw his chance to reconnect to his roots, returning home to call for an independent 
Chechen state. His determination was not based on power or wealth, but rather a strong sense of 
self, relaying his motivations, “I wasn’t looking for power, riches, or duties. I’ve always just had 
one idea—to fight for the Chechen people’s right to independence. That’s my life’s goal and I 
will not shy away from it. Not under any conditions, or any pressure.”50  
 A uniquely fashioned individual, Dudayev returned from Estonia, where he commanded 
an air squadron at a Soviet base in Tartu, to participate in the Congress of Chechen People in 
November 1990 to relay his thoughts to his countrymen. With passion and gusto, Dudayev 
declared to them what the Chechen responsibility was, with spectator soon to be VP, Zemlikan 
Yandarbiyev recalling: 
It was a short but very striking speech. He effectively said then that declaring an 
independent state was an act of great responsibility, something very difficult, but once we 
had declared it, we should go to the end. He said, using a saying we have, do not draw 
your kinzhal from its case, do not draw it without cause, but if your draw it, do not put it 
back without doing battle.”51  
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Yandarbiyev’s recollection of the speech shows that Dudayev was familiar with Chechen 
warrior culture despite his Soviet upbringing.52 Chechen Ethnographer Said-Magomed Khasiev 
supports this ancient cultural reference with his knowledge on the subject, “It was considered a 
shame and cowardice to draw a weapon at the offender and not strike. Therefore, the Chechens 
took up arms only in the most extreme cases.”53 With Dudayev’s homecoming and successful 
power seizure, Chechen independence adopted a slogan. This slogan positioned Chechnya 
against Russian authority, referencing to a higher power, “Chechnya is not a subject of Russia, it 
is a subject of Allah.”54 As Allah being the prophet of Islamic identification for the Chechen 
people, the slogan influenced actions towards independence. This slogan brought many Soviet-
minded Chechens to come home and accept the reawakened Chechen identity and national 
thought. The post-Soviet revival of Chechen national identity went hand in hand with the revival 
of Sufi Islam, often in opposition of Russian dominance in the region.  
Chechen Sufism 
 
When discussing about Chechen identity or national thought, two factors must be 
considered: Islam and the Chechen Adat. First, Chechen Sufism, a mystical form of Islam, will 
be explained. Keep in mind that the Chechen religious and cultural sphere intertwine and certain 
facets are interchanged from one to the other in regards to what is considered religious/ 
traditional. In addition, Chechen Sufism is political and often delineates loyalties based on 
religious group and family affiliation. The importance of these factors in regards to the slogan 
Akhmat-Sila is tantamount for the fact that the slogan incorporates a religious and a cultural 
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factor that ultimately solidifies the political stability of Ramzan Kadyrov’s affiliations. In 
addition, Kadyrov adds his own practices to his version of Sufism, which often run contradictory 
to tradition.  
  Scholars on Chechnya tend to underline Sufism’s importance. In Chechnya A Small 
Victorious War, Thomas De Wall explicates the historical importance of Sufism in Chechnya to 
emphasize the various Islamic interpretations Chechens embodied. De Wall states that Sufism is 
“…a highly decentralized order, which maintains its unity only through a community of purpose 
and the practice of simple ritual.”55 Anna Politkovskaya highlights that these orders (the 
dominant forms being the Naqshbandi and Qadiriya) are broken down into virds(brotherhoods), 
murids (disciples), Uztaz(teacher), Mullahs(Islamic scholars) and Muftis(Islamic law scholars).56 
Politkovskaya mentions that one brotherhood stands out politically, the “Kuntahadjin.”57 This 
decentralization of religion, meaning that there is no central imam or similar figure, separates 
Chechen Sufism from that of the more centralized orthodox Wahhabism which spread in the 
Second Chechen War. De Wall’s mention of simple ritual refers to the Chechen Adat, which 
differentiates Chechnya’s form of Islam from other forms practiced in neighboring Caucasus 
regions, which will be discussed after Chechen Sufism.  
Anatol Lieven expands on this religious uniqueness by developing Chechnya’s Islam as a 
form of ethno-identity. Lieven underscores that this identity forms “…with one formal religious 
allegiance” that emerges over an unset period of time and strengthens when an outsider invades 
their region, often of  “another religion.”58 In addition, Lieven expands on this idea stating that 
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outside forces reinforce the invaded group’s “threatened ethnos” to adhere to forms of the 
religion that will “strengthen military and or/cultural powers of resistance.”59 With caution, 
Lieven continues that the conflict could generate “new religious forms and institutions.”60 
Lieven’s statement could help explain the evolution of Sufism in Chechnya in regards to new 
forms(practices, chants) and institutions(possible pilgrimage site, buildings, etc) in the Kadyrov 
era. 
In The Effects of War on the Chechen National Identity Construction, National Identities,	
Aurélie Campana parses out a few other ideological differences on identity that circulated during 
the Chechen Wars, listing the following: “the separatists, the radical Islamists, the traditionalists, 
and the Pro-Russians.”61 Campana defines these “competing models of group identification” as 
an “identity narrative.”62 Some scholars define this identity narrative as a “ Competition between 
elites and the resulting selection or invention of symbols induces the politisation[sic] of culture, 
and the changing of self-definition within the community.”63 The invention of symbols is still 
relevant for the fact that Ramzan Kadyrov’s form of Chechen identity construction revolves 
around this change of definition and symbolization of his father and slogan.  
At the outset of the Chechen Wars, there were many groups that practiced different 
ideologies and programs. Each group had different moral codes(adat) and ideological/ religious 
convictions. The separatists’ main goal was an independent secular state with continued financial 
ties to the Russian Federation. This group would consist of General Dudayev, field commander 
and future Chechen president Aslan Maskadov until the Second Chechen War, and the Chechens 
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who supported the short-lived Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.64 The radical Islamists wanted not 
only sovereignty, but total financial independence and the creation of a sharia-abiding Islamic 
state. Field commander/terrorist Shamil Basayev, would rank top gun in this group, going to the 
extent of multiple attacks across Russia. These attacks included the week-long Budyonnovsk 
hospital hold up, the Beslan school siege with 300 deaths, and the seizure of a theater in Moscow 
resulting in 120 deaths.65 66 The traditionalists wanted independence, but to revert back to rule to 
the old Chechen clans, called teips, which governed the region based on family relations.67 
However, James Hughes argues that the teip’s traditional meanings and substance have 
changed over the centuries due to “military conquest, genocide, deportation, and 
commercialization.”68 Inevitably, there will be changes to any kind of structure given the 
generational traumas experiences by whole groups of people. The implications after years of 
conflict, the systemic killing of one’s countrymen, and the forceful removal from ancestral lands 
would cause many changes that may never recover. In addition, commercialization creates an 
economic factor that was not present in the resistance of Imam Shamil, industry in the lowlands. 
Opportunity brought many highlanders to the plains in search of financial stability.  
Taking these factors into consideration, the modern definition of what makes up a teip 
refers to extended familial connections. Teip confederations or agreements are called turqum, 
that can also result in political clientelism, and can overlap with some groups. The Kadyrov 
family would overlap into this group with their expansive Kunta-Hadji following benoy teip, 
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consisting of about 15% of the Chechen population.69 The final group, the Pro-Russians, is the 
group that Mufti Akmad-Hadji Kadyrov, Ramzan’s father, was the leader.  
Since taking control, Ramzan Kadyrov has his own twists to Sufism. The basis for his 
Sufism variation is based on historical roots to the Qadiriya order’s veneration of Kunta-Hadji, 
one of the order’s grandest disciples. In RFE/RL, Liz Fuller states that “Kunta-Hadji advocated 
the acceptance of infidel Russian domination in order to avert the extinction of the Chechen 
nation in an endless war against the Tsarist regime.”70 Fuller’s statement provides a historical-
religious basis for why Akhmad-Hadji’s decided to side with the Kremlin and why Ramzan 
venerates his father as a saint. Sufism expert Vakhit Akayev has agreeing views of the decision, 
comparing Akhmad-Hadji to Imam Shamil, stating, “Even the great Imam Shamil in the end 
gave himself up and lived in comfort at the tsar's court in St Petersburg.”71 Akhmad-Hadji’s 
similar actions to Kunta-Hadji’s creates a connection that Kadyrov can use to strengthen his 
slogan, Akhmat-Sila, demonstrating the religious and historical meaning enveloped into it while 
twisting it. 
This sanctification of Akhmad-Hadji has led to heretical practices not seen in other 
versions of Islam. Kadyrov included the Christian practice of Holy water. Fuller shines light on 
Kadyrov’s practice, using “Cisterns containing "holy water" from the chalice, liberally diluted 
with tap water, have been delivered throughout Chechnya in light of its imputed miraculous 
healing and reconciliatory properties, even though the Christian concept of "holy water" is totally 
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alien to Islam.”72 Islam in general does not venerate anyone other than God, which differs from 
Orthodoxy and Catholicism, which regularly venerate and canonize saints along with anointing 
with holy water. Fuller continues to create a religious sphere of contrasts, dichotomizing that 
“Salafis reject such elements of Sufism as the worship of Sufi saints and pilgrimages to holy 
places ("ziyart").73 These holy places can be found throughout Chechnya with Akhmad-Hadji’s 
image present and are “geared to redefining what is aesthetically and culturally acceptable under 
Chechen tradition.”74   
On the contrary, some mock this morphing of the aesthetic. On October 7th, 2020, 
YouTube channel 1Adat presents an unnamed man in a montage with a counter to shed light on 
the slogan and the absurdness of a flower laying ceremony at a monument dedicated to Akhmat-
Hadji. In the summary of the video, the author gives a statement, “ A video that clearly 
demonstrates that Kadyrov's criminals have nothing to do with Islam. They have their own 
Akhmat religion, they worship the apostate Akhmat who has rotted in the grave and praise him 
and not the Almighty, or they praise him more than the Almighty.”75 This statement against 
Kadyrov’s practices demonstrate that some young people are not accepting what he ritualizes. 
Despite what adherents believers think, Kadyrov has been creating favorable conditions for his 
imposed brand of Sufism to build up the veneration of Akhmad-Hadji over time, which has 
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Chechen Adat  
 
The second aspect of traditional/contemporary Chechen identity is the adat, the 
dominating rule of law by customs and traditions. The adat existed before Islam took a foothold 
in the Caucasus region. Surprisingly, when Islam did become widespread, the adat was 
intertwined to create a unique variant of Islam in the Sufi tradition, making adat and Chechen 
Islam inseparable. Due to Chechnya’s unique position with ancient culture and religion, a form 
of saintly worship has arisen known as Kadyrovism,76 which today influences Ramzan 
Kadyrov’s slogan, Akhmat-Sila, by giving it cultural credence that coincides with the religious. 
Joshua Yaffa’s interview with a local Mufti confirms this influences noting that deputy mufti 
Usman Osmaev said, “ What he has achieved is that we have returned to our roots: in religion, 
adat, culture.”77 Setting the religious aspect aside, Chechen adat follows a moral code that 
governed Chechens before Islam and often still govern them now. 
Scholars agree along similar lines on what makes up the Chechen adat. In the eye-witness 
account Allah’s Mountains, Sebastian Smith mentions the adat as “For rules of behavior, 
Chechens instead look to their own folk laws, such as the vendetta, hospitality, and the authority 
of elders.”78 James Hughes gives importance to the adat stating that Chechen “..customary law 
prevailed over strict observance of Islamic law, and where blood feuds and hostage-taking was 
the norm.”79 Anna Politkovskaya explains adat as, “the rules of Chechen life of the pre-Islamic 
period—which tend to preach family, neighborly, and communal values.”80 Andrew Meier 
underscores adat as “The principle rules and regulations of society,” in which was revived after 
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seven decades of Soviet rule at the start of the First Chechen War.81 Outsider views on the adat 
tend to agree with each other with few variations, but an insider perspective is warranted to 
develop a more holistic view of the adat.  
 In The Oath, Alkhan-Kala native Hassan Baiev explains the importance of Chechen 
tradition in war, asserting that “Women usually cover their heads with scarves outside on the 
street–such traditions help to preserve our culture. Without them, we will disappear as a nation; 
our traditions are the glue that hold us together, especially in chaotic times when everything is 
falling apart.”82 Baiev also demonstrates a code of silence in his university years when 
confronted by a KGB agent to snitch on his sport mates, “Being an informant was counter to all 
Chechen traditions.”83 Lieven encounters a similar situation in Chechnya in regards to revealing 
traditions. Lieven states that some conservative natives “who have remained closest to such 
traditions, have a great unwillingness to talk about them…,” meaning that silence is not only for 
friends, but for group traditions as well.84  
Independence and freedom run deep in traditional Chechen identity. The Chechen 
language has a term for it, called k’uonakh. In a study, Murat Ilyasov’s Chechen informant 
defines the term as: 
K’uonakh – is a person who respects elders, who takes care of his family and neighbors, 
who helps and protects the weak, who observes and defends moral values. He should be 
modest, but brave. This is not even one percent of the qualities a k’uonakh should 
possess. Briefly, he is an ideal person or a role-model for everybody. If you are a 
k’uonakh, you are a real Chechen. Oh, yes, it is important…, you cannot be a k’uonakh 
unless you are an oesdan [free, noble –Chechen] person.85 
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From this definition, some notable aspects of traditional Chechen identity revolve around good 
will, observance and maintenance of moral values, and most of all, being a free being, building 
off the word, “Oesdan”.86 The opposite term, “lai,” is a slave and one who will enslave others, 
but can also mean someone “taken prisoner or an outsider.”87 88 Tony Wood emphasizes this idea 
that the “concept of freedom has pride and[sic] place in Chechen culture as the language itself 
testifies, noting that the basic greeting translates “enter into freedom and the term for the word 
freedom in Chechen, “marsho,” has a broad meaning in “peace and well-being.”89 These 
Chechen words, often used meaningfully in traditional Chechen culture to relay the importance 
of freedom, would come to serve as a contrast to the Chechen society of today, in which freedom 
is redefined by Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov and then later developed by his son, Ramzan Kadyrov 
through his slogan Akhmat-Sila and Akhmad-Hadji’s acceptance of Russian backing for 
Chechnya remaining Russian territory. 
Akmad-Hadji Kadyrov 
 
Akmad-Hadji Kadyrov was a Chechen born out of the deportations who became a martyr 
with his assassination in 2004. Rather than being born in Chechnya and living through the 
Stalinist deportations, he was born a few years later in Kanghara, Kazakhstan in 1951, returning 
to Chechnya with his parents in 1957.90 During his time in Kazakhstan to 1980, much is unclear 
and not much is written about Akmad-Hadji’s life between those dates other than his studying of 
agriculture. Akmad-Hadji dove into religious studies during the 1980s of Gorbachev’s glasnost 
of the USSR in various locations to include Tashkent and Bukhara in Uzbekistan and in Jordan 
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and Oman.91 With his religious education, Akhmad-Hadji went on to develop the first Islamic 
studies center in Chechnya after the fall of the USSR and became the grand Mufti during 
Dudayev’s regime in Chechnya in 1993, thus calling the famous “jihad” against Russia in 1995 
in the First Chechen War.92 However, it was the elder Kadyrov’s reversal to side with Moscow 
that brought in the new era of changes for the region. Going against the grain of the Chechen 
tradition of freedom, Akhmad-Hadji fell in line with Lieven’s prediction for Chechnya’s future, 
foreshadowing, “The tensions between these old and new worlds in Chechnya will determine the 
country’s future.”93  
Although Akhmad-Hadji was pro-Chechen independence in the First Chechen War, he 
changed loyalties in the Second. Joshua Yaffa received some perspective on the Mufti from a 
former Chechen separatist minister named Ilyas Akhmadov while on a visit. Akhmadov stated, 
“He sincerely believed that he was saving the Chechen people from certain death.”94 This change 
in loyalty led some scholars to note that this break of affiliation caused "Wahhabist[sic] rebel 
leader Shamil Basayev put a price on Akmad's head at $100,000," and then former Chechen 
President Maskadov, who dropped the elder Kadyrov as Grand Mufti in 1999 due to sectarian 
antagonisms, topped Basayev with a bounty of “$250,000.”95 On the contrary, in an official 
interview for the late-Mufti’s would be 60th birthday, President Putin remembered his change of 
heart as a wise decision: 
It is no secret now that in the mid-1990s, he took part in the hostilities on the other side. 
He later switched sides because he changed his view on what was happening in Chechnya 
and in Russia as a whole. He did not go over to the Russian side because he was scared. 
He wasn’t scared of fighting or of anything else – I just mentioned how brave he was. He 
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came to the conclusion that it was time to put an end to that fratricidal war, that civil war 
in Russia. And he sincerely believed that Chechnya should remain with Russia – that’s 
what he told me many times. He sensed that need, being a religious leader.96 
 
In Ramzan Kadyrov’s regime, a critical civil servant agrees with Putin’s statement, saying, “He 
was courageous, though he won’t go down in history as a hero of his people…..He was smart. 
He didn’t lick the Russians’ boots. He wouldn’t have made a Putin Prospekt or founded a Putin 
fan club.”97 These views provide a clearer image into the shift and a sense of credibility to the 
elder Kadyrov’s character. Then, the late Novaya Gazeta reporter Anna Politkovskaya decided to 
get the information from the Mufti directly.  
On July 24th, 2000 In A Dirty War, Anna Politkovskaya interviewed the elder Kadyrov 
and explored his thoughts on Chechen independence and his call to jihad in the first war.98 This 
interview was one of the first to bring the Kadyrov family to light, possibly foreshadowing how 
the next 20 years will proceed in Chechnya. The elder Kadyrov gives his new view and 
definition on independence, which seems to contradict the traditional view to Chechen identity 
and freedom: 
Hence my main goal today: the nation must no longer be left stranded half-way; no 
longer must it be deceived by this “independence” and “liberty” that no one has ever 
actually given us and never will. Freedom, in fact, is something the ordinary man- and I 
count myself one, I come from a modest peasant family- does not need. He needs work 
and in return a wage and security.99 
 
Anna Politkovskaya’s interview highlights one of the key shifts in Chechen identity and Russian 
policy in Chechnya. Akhmad-Hadji emphasizes that instead of letting “our warrior instinct and 
ourselves to be exploited” for the sake of true freedom, speaks of a relative freedom.100 This 
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definition change of freedom would stop the violence and bring work and security to the 
population, with Kadyrov underscoring “that will be freedom for Chechnya” and not a “phony 
freedom.”101 Possibly, he was tired from war and the decimation of the Chechen population and 
Moscow knew his sentiments. 
 Sebastian Smith highlights a similar sentiment to Akhmad-Hadji’s while he was in 
Chechnya. Smith quotes his Chechen driver when they saw a flag with “Freedom-1991” written 
on it, grumbling, “What freedom are they talking about? Freedom is when you’ve got a little bit 
of money in your pocket and we haven’t had that for years now.”102 Smith’s driver’s resentment 
strikes a chord with the traditional Chechen sense of freedom, showing a shift of the definition 
that aligns with Akhmad-Hadji’s. The chief mufti was not alone in his want for financial stability 
and peace over full sovereignty. This shift brought all the other Chechen groups that Campana 
listed previously under the umbrella of enemies of the state.  
This blanketing of anti-Russian separatist groups made Akhmad-Hadji’s Pro-Russian 
forces the sole legitimate authority in Chechnya. Akhmad-Hadji’s Kremlin-approved authority 
helped him consolidate power and legitimize his son Ramzan Kadyrov’s militia, the Kadyrovtsy. 
The Second Chechen War was in full effect, handing off Moscow’s control of operations to the 
Kadyrov family.103 This handing off of operational authority from Federal to locally-led forces 
would be coined Chechenisation, meaning that Kadyrov has autonomous control, to include 
control over the FSB on the counter-insurgency with full financial support from Moscow for 
weapons, stipends, and state security. 
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Akmad-Hadji’s Death and Ramzan’s Rise To Power 
 
Akmad-Hadji Kadyrov went to paradise when he perished  at the then Dinamo Stadium 
during a May 9th Victory Day parade “in a bomb attack by secessionists in 2004.”104 Akmad-
Hadji’s death fit more the description of a political assassination, but the details can be 
conflicting between the Russian State or Chechen jihadi responsibility. Many analysts think that 
Shamil Basayev or Aslan Maskhadov were responsible, but, some disagree due to the nature of 
the explosive and the technicalities required to set the device properly.105 Maskhadov, although 
at great odds with Akhmad-Hadji for years before his death, the day after the bombing denied 
any involvement, stating “ Violence will never solve our problems.”106 Other analysts believe 
rather than claiming one problem for the event, that its roots ran deeper from the exclusion of 
other Chechen clans into the government.107 Regardless of who killed the Pro-Russian head of 
Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov was ready to lead his Kadyrovtsy on the offensive. Although too 
young to be appointed the head of the region, Ramzan Kadyrov was able to take the position of 
vice premier until he reached the age of 30, the legal age of appointment in the Russian 
constitution. Instead, the former MVD chief, Alu Alkhanov came into the Chechen presidency 
with Kremlin-backed Potemkin style elections.108 109  
The son Kadyrov did not stay long in his vice premier position. With a series of 
unfortunate events within the administration, he claimed the seat in parliament for the United 
Russia party and then, rose to Prime Minister after the acting MP, Sergei Abramov, was 
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seriously injured in a car wreck and decided to forgo the position and hand it off to Ramzan, 
deeming it was the “most appropriate.”110 Rather, it was Putin’s political promise to Ramzan 
coming to fruition, with his 30th birthday already passed in October 2006. Not surprisingly, the 
acting President Alu Alkhanov suddenly resigned, opening the window to the young and 
ambitious Kadyrov without delay, allowing Putin an earlier chance to appoint him to the position 
before he could be officially set in stone with a “popular election.”111 After gaining the 
presidency, Kadyrov changed the Chechen constitution giving him unlimited terms to rule. This 
is when Kadyrov would start to apply heavy pressure to the jihadis and in the process, rack up 
multiple human-rights violations along the way.112 
In  Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States, Kimberly Marten labels Ramzan a 
Warlord, which Marten defines as “individuals who control small pieces of territory using a 
combination of force and patronage.”113 Furthering the definition for the modern strongman, 
Marten adds, “Warlords rule in defiance of genuine state sovereignty but through the complicity 
of state leaders.”114 Here the complicit leader is President Vladimir Putin. Once Kadyrov took 
power in 2007, for a few years he went on the offensive. Kadyrov annihilated rival factions, 
weeded out jihadis, took drastic measures to abduct their family members to bring them out from 
hiding, arson, and public humiliation on local television.  
Surprisingly, Kadyrov did offer a level of clemency to the rebels, often offering the 
captured rebel a chance to flip to his Pro-Russia side. Kadyrov then would patronize the rebel or 
family member changing affiliations. On one occasion, the father of a Chechen terrorist who 
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took part in the 2002 Moscow theater massacre asked Kadyrov if he could return to Chechnya so 
he could live out the rest of his life in peace and die at home. Kadyrov granted his wish, then 
patronized him with a “banquet, a car, and financial support.”115 The level of support we cannot 
be sure about or how sincere the clemency was since this affirmation came from a Kadyrov 
arranged press-interview, meaning little to all could have been fabricated, or just enough money 
would be doled out to keep the recipient quiet. The main point of this act is that to a wider 
population, Kadyrov comes off as the benevolent leader of Chechnya, bringing law and order 
with an iron fist, but soft enough to offer rehabilitation to Chechens who may have strayed from 
the Pro-Russian Kadyrov Chechen ideal.  
 Ramzan Kadyrov would continue his warlord tactics of persuasion by force and 
patronage for years to come, although the Federal Russian government officially declared the 
Chechen  “counterterrorism” campaign complete in April 2009.116 However, the reality of the 
counterinsurgency did not end for many Chechens. With the majority or the insurgents pushed 
out of Chechnya, annihilated, or captured and converted to Kadyrov’s side, Kadyrov developed a 
force more intimidating than the FSB. Many Chechens faced extrajudicial punishment, torture, 
psychological anguish, and death during these operations, with the sole accusation of being a 
“bandit” or being the family of one.117 The Kadyrovtsy militia conducted these notorious 
operations with near impunity from the Russian government. 
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Ramzan Kadyrov’s militia, the Kadyrovtsy, as Koch describes, consists of “ex-rebels, 
criminals, and inexperienced hopefuls.”118 In the group’s origins, many of the original fighters 
were part of the Kadyrov teip, the Benoi and those with familial relations. Then, when Akhmad 
Kadyrov sided with Moscow for autonomy and financing to rebuild Chechnya, the ranks started 
to swell with a wider variation of recruitment. For many of the ex-rebels, joining the ranks of the 
Kadyrovtsy was their only way out from being hunted down by Kadyrov and providing practical 
safety from FSB operatives. Akhmad-Hadji’s ability to turn the enemy to his side due to cultural 
connections and knowledge was key to leveraging former hostility to his advantage. 
Chechen rebels groups in the Second Chechen War were tight-knit units and knew each 
other from the First Chechen War, many of which had large extended families. Due to these 
regional networks, resistance was futile for self-preservation and the prevention of unfavorable 
consequences to extended family members. Ramzan Kadyrov was able to tap into these social 
connections within clan society to use the Kadyrovtsy efficiently to target and single-out rebels. 
Previously, Moscow chose Akmad Kadyrov for these personal connections to the insurgency and 
his ability to go around the clan “taboo” of talking about internal affairs with Russian 
outsiders.119 The Kadyrovtsy were so successful at flipping the rebels that during the beginning 
of the counterinsurgency the militia consisted of more or less “three-fourths” of flipped men.120 
 Notoriously, the Kadyrovtsy received their reputation during this counterinsurgency 
period. Joshua Yaffa highlights why rebel fighters were scared with a 2009 local TV interview 
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where Kadyrov berated some rebels, “You want to kill people? You kill my comrades, I’ll kill 
your father, your brother, all your pets.”121 Although the arbitrary home raid kidnappings of 
suspected terrorists, opposition politicians, and suspected supporters were more precise than their 
Russian counterparts during the “zachistki,” which brought all Chechen men between 15 and 55 
to filtration camps, were very aggressive to the point of total submission or death. Other than 
Chechens carrying out these operations, there was not much to differentiate them from the 
previous Federal Russian operations. The collective punishment was inevitable and the militia 
would terrorize many innocent Chechens along the way.122  
One illustrative example of these far reaching Kadyrovtsy actions was when they 
searched for the former Maskhadov Defense Minister, Magomed Khambiev. The militia went so 
far that they rounded up and tortured “80 of his family members,” leading to his surrender.123 
Yaffa highlights Kadyrov’s effectiveness when Khambiev relayed what Ramzan told him, 
“Ramzan said to me, ‘Think about it—I am giving you the chance to live in peace.’”124 As a 
result, Khambiev wanted peace. Afterward, he was given a law enforcement leadership position 
in Kadyrov’s regime. In due time, many Chechens labeled the Kadyrovtsy as “perhaps more 
horrible than the federals.”125 The federals in this context serves to describe the Russian state 
security and military armed forces not under Kadyrov’s command. Unlike the federals, the 
Kadyrovtsy ability to blend in with their own population, utilize personal connections, and 
impose internal clan knowledge that by the Chechen adat was taboo to speak about with the 
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federals, could be communicated to the militia and directly to Kadyrov to weed out family 
members, some mired in personal conflicts, and to settle a blood feud with impunity. 
 Over time, the Kadyrovtsy merged with official federal forces, becoming their own 
legitimate battalion(s). In 2015, according to the Moscow Times, the Kadyrovtsy numbered at a 
massive 20,000 soldiers.126 This approximation places the group at a size between a division and 
a corps, not quite an official army, but nevertheless quite a formidable force, with many 
members having years of combat experience. A year later, Mark Galeotti raised the number to 
around 30,000.127 The Kadyrovtsy are rumored to be ready to carry out hits on Putin’s 
adversaries, with the highest profile hit being Boris Nemtsov, a former Moscow Mayor and 
opposition politician, gunned down in broad daylight in front of the Kremlin. Kadyrov denied 
involvement, but overtly shows his support of Putin, “As long as Putin backs me up I can do 
everything, God is great!”128  
Even as a so called legitimate federal force, Putin has no real control of the Chechen 
armed forces nor its commander. The Kadyrovtsy pledge only to serve one man—Ramzan 
Kadyrov. On April 21st, 2015, Kadyrov even went as far to declare on local television that if any 
federal forces come into his region without permission that he has given the order to his men to 
“shoot to kill.”129 Today, this group is more or less spread out through other armed forces with 
Zamid Chelaev130 commanding the Kadyrovtsy and СОБР Терек being led by one of Kadyrov’s 
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war-time comrades, Abuzaid Vismuradov, also known by nom de guerre “Patriot” commanding 
the force.131 132 
The Chechen armed forces(which can all be Kadyrovtsy), although seeming 
exceptionally thuggish, represent a path for ordinary Chechen men who may not be as fortunate 
or as talented as some of Kadyrov’s prized fighters to represent themselves in the broader 
warrior tradition. Not only do they represent a culturally respected profession, but they are also 
able to connect to their past while simultaneously presenting a modern force that would not have 
been possible without Russian financing. These armed members can act out the character 
historically imposed and locally accepted by serving the man with the power and the clout to 
change their lives. Not only is Kadyrov’s relationship with Moscow bringing them status, but it 
also reinforces centuries-old imaginaries of Chechens as fierce, pious warriors willing to follow 
their leader to death. No matter how notorious picking up the gun for Kadyrov seems for the 
Western world, this mutated form of the imagined warrior serves the regime better than the 
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Chapter 2: Recent Research on Ramzan Kadyrov’s Social Media 
 
The recent literature regarding Ramzan Kadyrov’s social media use spans over the scope 
of the last 5 to 6 years on his official Instagram account. Although there are not many articles on 
the topic, the discussion is growing. One of the firsts articles to shed light on the subject with 
qualitative and quantitative data analysis is Karina Avedissian’s Clerics, weightlifters, and 
politicians: Ramzan Kadyrov's Instagram as an official project of Chechen memory and identity 
production. Avedissian attempts to show how a Chechen strongman is able to utilize an 
“inherently democratizing technology,” to maintain social and political control. 133 This research 
angle of a Chechen strongman’s use of social media is interesting since it goes against the 
popular study of the populace using it to “reassert themselves and subvert traditional methods of 
social and political control.”134  
Avedissian’s research focuses on discourse analysis on data from 170 Instagram posts on 
Ramzan Kadyrov’s profile (Kadyrov_95) for a 1-month duration while it existed. In 2017, the 
Guardian reported that U.S. sanctions required Instagram to delete Kadyrov’s profile, making 
Ramzan Kadyrov “the only person on Earth to be kicked off Instagram.”135 His account 
accidently reopened in 2018, leading Kadyrov to declare to his pistol, “How many well-aimed, 
lead ‘words’ have you told my enemies and to scoundrels while defending my honour, dignity 
and life,” surprising his 3 million estimated followers.136 Afterward, Instagram caught their slip 
and reclosed the account. 
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 Due to this instance, any research that was done on Kadyrov’s original account is vital 
for the growth of the ongoing discussion. Avedissian’s research revolves around 3 topics widely 
seen and used by Kadyrov that shape the national Chechen identity; these forums are on Islam, 
sport, and government public relations.”137 In the article portion pertaining to Islam, Ramzan 
Kadyrov can be seen as the defender of Sufi practices against the invasive and foreign Islamic 
Salafi teachings, reconstructing them as “enemies of Islam” and the need to be annihilated.138 
Avedissian presents Kadyrov’s piousness and how he uses his own personal brand to implement 
“Islamic” teachings more effectively than the Salafi Caucasus Emirate, which were more 
orthodox in the Salafi School.139  
The second domain analyzes Kadyrov’s use of sports to gain cultural legitimacy 
worldwide by promoting Chechen combat-sport fighters and a healthy lifestyle through exercise. 
Avedissian emphasizes that Kadyrov makes it a “political priority” to support the sports culture 
in Chechnya and bases cohesion on the regional and international arena.140  Kadyrov facilitates 
Chechen “masculinity” through contemporary combat-sport competition.141 Combat-sports also 
serve as an outlet for young Chechens, many who see this avenue as a recreation of Chechen 
warrior culture sans war. Baiev highlights this in his memoir during his teenage years, stating, “ 
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Chechens need to be strong. Our people had learned that from all those years of resisting the 
Russians” and that “Most men in Chechnya go in for judo, sombo[sic], boxing, and wrestling.”142 
 In the third cultural domain of government public relations, Avedissian underscores 
Kadyrov’s politics shown through his posts that he has built up credibility and legitimacy with 
foreign nations and regions of the Russian Federation. Avedissian emphasizes that Kadyrov 
constantly repeats that the reason they are making such progress is that they need Russia to 
continue to keep going forward.143 Avedissian concludes that her findings show Kadyrov’s 
reconstruction of the three cultural domains of Islam, sport, and government public relations on 
Instagram give him a moral, institutional and cultural legitimacy that fits into the Kremlin’s 
narrative for the region against internal threats (Salafi Islam, pro-independence, and human-
rights advocates) and external threats (international terrorism and the West), thus being able to 
safeguard Russia’s national security interests while maintaining regional power.144  
Avedissian understands that the scope of her research was only on Ramzan Kadyrov’s 
account. Avedissian explores a small portion of it, which leaves what was not included to the 
imagination. The research Avedissian did include though is vital now due to Kadyrov’s original 
account closure. Despite the expected gaps, Avedissian’s research of the three reoccurring 
cultural domains in Ramzan Kadyrov’s Instagram creates a base for further research on Chechen 
identity on social media and its development as Kadyrov continues his reign. These elements 
identified in Avedissian’s work can also be seen to a great extent in Kadyrov’s slogan, Akhmat-
Sila. 
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   Avedissian’s work is expanded on a few years later in the article Dictator’s Instagram: 
personal and political narratives in a Chechen leader’s social network. In this article, Elena 
Rodina and Dmitri Dligach conduct analytical discursive research wider in scope, but still based 
on quantitative data on discourse analysis produced by Kadyrov’s Instagram account. Instead of 
three cultural domains and a one month duration as previously, the scope is widened to cover 24 
topics found in Kadyrov’s 6854 Instagram posts over a 2-and-a-half-month period, thus 
subgrouping the 24 main topics of interest under 2 different main topics, one that includes all 12 
personal topics, the latter containing the remaining 17 public/political topics.145 Avedissian notes 
that in the beginning, when Kadyrov first opened his Instagram account, it was more personal in 
nature with him writing about his mom in a caring tone. In one post showing this caring nature 
Kadyrov writes “Thanks to my Mom everything was tasty now I have to work.”146 Rodina and 
Dligach present the evolution of Ramzan Kadyrov’s perception on self-identity through a few 
other political/public themes147 using a topic model probability rating and how he is a bastion of 
his culture through his love of “traditional singing and dancing.”148 Much of this tradition 
singing and dancing come in the form of the Lezginka dance and singing in the form of the 
Chechen Zikr, a local religious practice with pre-Islamic origins.149 
 Over time, Kadyrov’s posts start becoming more political, while his personal posts are 
framed more frequently politically. Rodina and Dligach conclude that their research will be part 
of an ongoing discourse and that their scope of research focuses only on Kadyrov’s posts. Rodina 
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and Dligach acknowledge that more focused analysis is needed on the commentary, pictures, and 
videos that are posted from others onto Kadyrov’s posts. They leave out that the same type of 
research can be seen inversely, such as the amount of times the Chechen leader appears in a 
regular citizen’s posts on Instagram or other popular social media platforms. Next I will 
breakdown a journal article that focused on traditional forms of media.  
In Seeking Chechen Identity between Repression and Self-Determination under the 
Ramzan Kadyrov Regime, Gisela Erbsloh reveals a contrary Checheness that does not follow the 
cult of personality narrative nor tradition. To demonstrate her argument, Erbsloh conducts 30 
interviews of Chechens along with a thematic analysis of two regional publications: Dosh and 
Zhenskoe Slovo.150 Most importantly, Erbsloh does not take an academic angle to her research, 
but rather just presents it as an outlet to amplify non-conforming Chechen voices. Knowing that 
opposition to the Kadyrov narrative is inherently dangerous, the names of the people interviewed 
are anonymized to protect their identities. Erbsloh emphasizes that not all Chechen’s fell into the 
Kadyrov status-quo and that there is an active yet small civil society in the authoritarian state. 
Many of these activists-journalists work in media outlets, non-government organizations, and 
academia. However, this counter narrative treads a thin line that often leads to trouble for some 
of Chechnya’s inhabitants. 
Dosh published the unfortunate situation of one of Chechnya’s inhabitants who went 
against Kadyrov’s control of historical memory, Ruslan Kataev. Kataev was imprisoned when he 
attempted to gather historians at the Grozny National Library to discuss the 70th anniversary of 
Stalin’s deportations of 1944 of Chechens to Kazakhstan. When Kataev refused to stop his 
gathering, Kadyrov’s authorities falsified charges to imprisoned him, fired the library director, 
                                               




and cancelled future intellectual meetings at the library. Erbslöh and another interviewee agree 
with issue no.47 of Dosh’s publishing of Kataev’s trial statement that a free Chechen is an 
imprisoned one, with Kataev stating: 
I was born with a pronounced instinct for freedom and an absolute sense of justice and 
honor. I, an experienced politician and political analyst, repeat here in this cage: I am a 
free Chechen. I know that in the course of history there have always been troubled 
times, and in times of trouble we have to pay for the convictions that we as 
citizens hold. And that is why I am here.151 
 
Kataev’s statement demonstrates the quagmire of not only himself, but of Chechens as a whole 
in the Kadyrov regime. This conviction expands to all those who do not see Kadyrov’s new 
Chechnya in high regards and the price that will be paid to hold on to these convictions. 
 Erbsloh persuades the reader that much of the destruction caused by the Kadyrov regime 
has been the destruction of places that could have been reconstructed or renovated, but rather, 
replaced with the brand new urban landscape that Grozny boasts today.152 Erbslöh’s interview 
with A Grozny City architect, Balaudi Magomadov underscores that the destruction of original 
Chechen buildings signifies the erasure of the old Chechnya for the realization of Kadyrov’s 
Chechnya to “restore cleanliness and order.”153 Magomadov, careful with his words, adds "they 
tore down everything of historical significance” in favor for the new and the beautiful, even if 
the Kadyrov-approved edifices were not as structurally sound.154 Magomadov relates this 
destruction of historically significant buildings as a way for Kadyrov to solidify his regime into 
memory while the old fades from collective consciousness.  
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Along with new infrastructure, photos are placed in all establishments to remind the 
citizens of Grozny and Chechnya of their leaders. Three photos triangulate President Putin as the 
overall ruler, Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov as the legacy of the New Chechnya, and a photo of 
Ramzan Kadyrov to acknowledge his “tireless efforts on behalf of the Chechen people.”155  
Although Kadyrov’s efforts to shape the Chechen Identity has been effective for many, 
especially many of the younger people who were born and grew up in the turmoil of war, his 
influence is not necessarily the same for the other generations who knew the Chechens of 
another era. Erbsloh relates this instance with an interview with and educator with the 
pseudonym Mar’iam Sh.156  
  Mar’iam Sh reminisces on the memory of her grandfather and how in her opinion, was 
able to give her a “ true Chechen upbringing.”157 Erbslöh highlights this upbringing by listing 
attributes of Mar’iam Sh’s grandfather stating, “Her grandfather was a highly educated man who 
survived the Stalin-era Gulag. From him she learned to respect herself and others, and neither to 
let anyone humiliate her nor to stand by and watch while others are humiliated.”158 This 
childhood experience is subjective, but treads a similar  line to other Chechen upbringings. Baiev 
mentions his definition of love growing up due to his upbringing, “I have always understood love 
as loyalty and support of family, friend; love is education of children; love is helping the 
elderly.”159 Loyalty to family, education, and respect to others are areas that resonate in both 
statements.160 
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Erbsloh successfully identifies that there is a discrepancy on the idea of a true Chechen 
identity. In today’s Chechnya, a skewed version of Chechen identity is promoted, one that aligns 
with Kadyrov’s views of servility and loyalty to his regime. As an educator, Mar’iam Sh does 
her part to educate young Chechens, but the situation she says is similar to Stalin’s time, where 
all the curriculum is influenced by the head of state. Erbsloh’s acknowledges her interviewee’s 
angst and agrees on the struggle, stating that “ They have learned to do whatever pleases 
Kadyrov in order to meet their own material needs.”161  
Another Kadyrov twisted folk custom is that of collective punishment. Erbsloh highlights 
this morphing of ancient custom, stating, “ In Chechnya, for instance, Kadyrov has revived in 
badly distorted form the ancient custom of kinship-based liability (veras), by which families 
share responsibility for a crime committed by a family member. What is different now is 
Kadyrov's insistence on punishing the family, as well as their criminal relative.”162 This 
distortion of ancient custom is significant because Kadyrov has been actively morphing so called 
traditions and customs as tasks towards his vision for political, social, and cultural control.  Not 
only does this revival of custom provide a cultural basis to family policing, but reinforces loyalty 
by Kadyrov’s preferable distortion of the custom.  
Erbsloh concludes by returning to her original question, on how and why these 
publications of Dosh and Zhenskoe Slovo might be seen as a threat to the credibility of the 
Kadyrov regime due to the publications’ push for a “Chechnya with its mix of traditional values 
and civil-society.”163 Dosh is responsible for delivering an alternative narrative to Kadyrov’s, 
laying the ground work for a future civil society when the authoritarian regime implodes.  
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Erbsloh underscores that the reemergence of forgotten historical memory, increased dialogue 
emphasis, and the expansion of a network of intellectuals across various fields continue to 
support Dosh’s mission of delivering independent news to the North Caucasus.  
Erbsloh led her article on the basis of traditional media and counter-narrative interviews, 
but does not include Kadyrov’s social media presence in her research. Kadyrov’s Instagram 
account was active during this period and open. Although the scope of her research focused on 
two publications and interviews, a mention of Kadyrov’s prowess on social media would have 
added another medium to expand on, more precisely to see if a counter-narrative exists in the 
social media sphere. She does touch on that Dosh has an online platform, but other than this 
instance, social media is left to the wayside to expand more on the current underground 
traditional media in the region. 
In The ‘Real’ Chechen Man: Conceptions of Religion, Nature, and Gender and the 
Persecution of Sexual Minorities in Postwar Chechnya, Dominic Scicchitano explores the many 
factors of the Chechen identity that makes the culture hostile to sexual others as non-traditional 
and not in line with Ramzan Kadyrov’s ideal heteronormative community of Chechnya, leading 
to LBGTQ persecution in the region.164  Scicchitano frames the article around Kadyrov’s 
projected masculinity on Instagram and so-called traditional Chechen values regarding Islam 
and warrior culture to show how Chechen adat is incompatible in a globally liberalizing world. 
Although Islam forbids senseless killing, the adat demands families with suspected 
homosexuals to redeem their respect by ridding themselves of the family member with “honor 
killings.”165 Scicchitano’s labeling of Kadyrov’s traditional Chechen views hold some agency 
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although Kadyrov’s Chechen ideal is skewed and does not hold the religious traditional aspects 
explored earlier in Russian literature and Erbslöh’s interviews with locals. Kadyrov holds on to 
the warrior imaginary of generations’ past, reconfiguring the warrior into the combat sport-
fighter or the soldier in his armed forces. Regardless of the variation of Islam practiced in 
Chechnya, Kadyrov’s is traditional in the context that it is the dominant order in Chechnya and 
still contains the ancient adat, which Scicchitano shines a light on the aspect of honor killings if 
someone is found to be homosexual.  
Scicchitano uses Benedict Anderson’s theory of “imagined community”166 to expand on 
and parse out three themes: war’s heteronormative machismo and feminization in the first 
Chechen War followed by the changes in the second, natural imagery and animalization linked to 
Chechen identity and othering, and how contemporary Chechen identity is shaped with the 
absence of war. Scicchitano expands greatly into Kadyrov’s social media use and how he uses it 
to create “the real Chechen man.”167 In a patriarchal militarized society such a Chechnya, 
Scicchitano emphasizes that the homosexual man represents a weakness, one that needs to be 
dealt with by force. This militarization pairs with the animalization of a group of people, likening 
gays to Chechen jihadists to be considered “sub-human”  and were called “bandits” and 
“werewolves.”168 This animalization of non-traditional sexual others dichotomized them against 
the ideal Checheness of heterosexual norms, leading to ever-growing hostilities to gender 
minority individuals in the population.  Building off these two themes, Scicchitano merges them 
with Ramzan’s digital presence in the after war and insurgency years and his formation of the 
contemporary Chechen identity through his Akhmat-Fight Clubs, denials of Gay men in 
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Chechnya, and his macho demonstrations on his Instagram such as wrestling dangerous animals 
or working out with his friends.  
In conclusion, Scicchitano reiterates that Chechen identity needs to include the LGBTQ 
community one day and to stop the persecution if they plan to progress as a society keen on 
progress in line with Western norms that revolve around human rights, social tolerance, and the 
development of the region through a free market and not entirely on state funds.169 In addition, 
Scicchitano makes sure to dichotomize his ideal of progress and that of Kadyrov’s, which 
includes branding Chechnya as a world of machismo, huge projects such as phallic skyscrapers, 
and MMA areas to house and entertain those within his ideal world. Although this research was 
not directly focused on Kadyrov’s social media, use, it was definitely a factor for evidence and 
adds a building block to anyone wanting to continue the discussion on Chechen identity online 
and in social media, and how this culture branding excludes social others in the region. 
Recent developments in Chechnya and Other Areas for Discussion 
 
Outside of academic literature, Ramzan Kadyrov has often been depicted consistently on 
digital outlets for his exaggerated social media use(or misuse), human rights abuses, his 
notorious presence in MMA culture, security forces, and U.S. sanctions. At the time of this 
writing, Ramzan Kadyrov and Donald J. Trump are the only people in the world to be kicked off 
social media platforms indefinitely (Kadyrov had a snide remark when this happened after the 
January 6th, 2021 U.S. Capitol riots.) After hearing of Trump’s blocked social media accounts, 
on January 8th, 2021 Kadyrov stated on Telegram:170  
Теперь мы с Трампом в чём-то похожи: если ранее он заблокировал меня в 
соцсетях, то сейчас Всевышний восстановил справедливость, и в итоге аккаунты 
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мятежного Дональда Трампа тоже заблокированы. Вот относился бы он с 
уважением к демократии и правам человека, ничего такого, наверное, не 
произошло бы...171 
 
Kadyrov’s remark garnered attention for the fact that Trump had blocked him twice before, and 
likened Trump’s account restriction as brought on by the Almighty, bring retribution to a social 
media starved Chechen strongman but at the same time, elevating his position to that of the U.S. 
President. Ramzan Kadyrov’s Telegram would be another area to explore in future research.   
 Another controversial topic that needs to be looked into further is how Kadyrov’s 
jurisdiction sometimes extends to other North Caucasus neighboring regions and or its people 
visiting Chechnya. On December 16th, 2020, North Ossetian Blogger Malika Djikaeva’s March 
9th , 2020 arrest was posted on @pro_chechnya.172 She was arrested in Grozny on marijuana 
possession charges while making a visit to the republic with a group of friends. Although she is 
not Chechen, her presence in the region did not fit into Kadyrov’s ideal imaginary of a proper 
Muslim woman, thus probably compelling him to direct his security forces to stage her arrest. 
 As a social-media blogger, Malika was known for posting wild videos of herself. Some 
of these activities involved live streams of shooting guns, fighting other women, kissing a lion 
cub, swimming in her hijab, wearing tighter than acceptable clothing by local standards, shaving 
her upper-lip, arm-wrestling, drinking wine, and lighting another woman’s dress on fire. Her 
overall message was to show women that you are free even when you wearing your hijab and or 
the abaya. Malika often performed exaggerated actions to prove her point. Currently Djikaeva is 
serving out her 3 year sentence at a work colony, but has be transferred to a pre-trial prison.173  
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Screenshots from Djikaeva’s reel @pro_chechnya on Instagram December 16th, 2020.  
Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CI3R0qABFqx/  
 
 
 On January 20th ,2021, along with his entourage, Kadyrov carried out a successful anti-
terrorism operation against the supposedly last remaining ISIS-affiliated underground cell in the 
region affirming that,“All underground bands in Chechnya have now been eliminated.”174 The 
annihilated combatants also took park in a 2011 Moscow airport bombing that killed 37 people.  
There are a few videos of the operation in circulation  ranging from wild with Ramzan Kadyrov 
and his main entourage taking part along with the Kadyrovtsy in the operation with automatic 
machine gun firing and battle cries to relatively tame, such as this TASS news reel. After the 
operation and a congratulations from President Putin, footage of the operation spread on social 
media and made it to areas outside the Chechen sphere, such as the Instagram page 





                                               









L-R:An MVD Officer, Ramzan Kadyrov, and war time friend and SOBR Terek Commander Abdulazaid 
Vismuradov, known as “Patriot.” January 20th 2021. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CKRtDMUnuBJ/  
 
Of course, at the end of the news reel, Kadyrov wraps it with a gregarious “Allahu-Akbar, 
Akhmat-Sila,” letting the world  know that the higher powers of God and his Father led to a 
successful strike. The comment section is a clown show of praise, criticism, and inquiry to many, 
but nevertheless this is a non-Chechen account and has a wider fan base outside of Kadyrov 












Chapter 3: Nation Branding Theoretical Framework 
 
I will delve into my research on Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov’s slogan Akhmat-
Sila with the theoretical framework of nation branding. Many attributes of Kadyrov’s online and 
offline activities coincide with other nationalistic strongmen worldwide. These strongmen 
include former U.S. President Donald J. Trump, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, and Indian 
Prime Minister Narenda Modi using similar methods for their versions of national identity 
formation and narrative construction. Within these constructions, there are semiotic and semantic 
devices that signal to certain communities within their respective nations.175 In Research 
Companion to Language and Country Branding, Johanna Tovar states that if these devices are 
“Used effectively, it is believed to help a country gain a competitive advantage. Used 
ineffectively, it is believed that it can damage a country’s image and identity..”176 However, there 
is one main difference that separates Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov from these world 
leaders. 
That difference is that Kadyrov controls a Chechen nation under the parameters of 
Russian control. Russian President Vladimir Putin dictates the parameters of Kadyrov’s agency 
and influence, but does not control him. Kadyrov controls the ethno-national space afforded him. 
Due to this outlier in power dynamics, his branding will often be placed within a grander Pro-
Russian narrative. Kadyrov’s exceptionalism in his control of Chechnya does not go unnoticed. 
Caucasus expert at the Official Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology Sergei Arutyunov 
states: 
What goes on there is impossible in the rest of Russia. It’s extraordinary that Kadyrov is 
able to be absolutely independent in his decision making, while he is simultaneously 
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completely dependent on the Kremlin for his funding. Chechnya survives thanks to vast 
subsidies from Moscow, yet Russian authority scarcely exists there.177 
 
Nevertheless, this does not hamper Kadyrov’s similarities with these world leaders. The key 
aspect for Kadyrov is that the context of the region controlled is smaller, which gives Chechnya 
a unique position. Rather than solely nation branding, Chechnya could be considered a mixture 
of nation, local, and social media branding dependent on re-circulation and preferable 
performances. These branding aspects thus influences how Chechnya is perceived in the digital 
and physical international sphere.  
Nation Branding theory fits best to describe Kadyrov’s slogan. Nation Branding 
according to Andrew Graan is a relatively recent construct, noting that, “…as a professional 
service and political project, is a historically recent phenomenon.”178 Homi Bhabha believes the 
notion as a “repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative.”179 Stephen Hutchings explicates 
the concept as “the boundaries and values of nations, national cultures and national identities, are 
within this framework, neither reified nor stable but rather porous, ever-shifting, pluri-accentual 
and multi-directional.”180 These statements coincide with earlier scholars who agree that the 
concept is “the imperative to cultivate a consistent representation of the brand image,” leading to 
these recognizable patterns.181 In this sense, these representations contain a value that “makes 
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them known to a social domain of persons through its dissemination,” with many other 
embedded cultural, social, and historical factors tied to it to assist in proliferation.182   
The main aspect these scholars emphasize for nation branding is the proliferation of a repetitive, 
recirculating performance. This performance could be a certain action, such as a chant, ritual, 
reprinting or reimaging, etc. These ideas on nation-branding will be utilized to help explain the 
proliferation of performative recirculation of Ramzan Kadyrov’s slogan, Akhmat-Sila.  
To define nation branding, I will break down the term into its two separate parts, that of 
what constitutes a nation and then the brand. Nation will be analogous with country in the 
context of Chechnya’s unique autonomous status, thus defining a country as an area that 
“consists of populations ranging from tens of thousands to a billion-plus who live in a designated 
territory.” 183 Buiter likens nation branding as a “single purposefully acting agent.”184 Ramzan 
Kadyrov’s Chechnya has defined borders that are legitimized by the Russian Federation and has 
a long time population that share a common ethnicity, local language, customs, and culture that 
ultimately differentiate the Chechen people from others within the federation. These attributes 
give Chechnya the definition as a nation, even though the region is not a sovereign state and is 
reliant on Russia for its encompassing governing framework. Akhmat-Sila attempts to 
encapsulate this positionality within Russia while promoting the region’s particularities as a 
nation within a nation.  
 In Research Companion to Language and Country Branding, Johanna Tovar defines 
branding as “a process of identity construction, whereby entities in general and countries in 
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particular gain visibility and distinctively put themselves on the world map by drawing on their 
history, culture, economy, society, natural beauty, and, last but not least, their people.”185  In 
Brand, Citationality, Performativity, Constantine Nakassis considers the brand as “performative” 
and “citational.”186 Using branding in the identity formation context, we can say that Ramzan 
Kadyrov actively molds Chechen identity how he feels will show Chechnya and its people for 
their time tested positive qualities; warrior-culture, adherence to Islam, a deep sense of ancient 
ties, and loyalty(politically). Kadyrov also needed a way for this reimagined Chechen identity to 
be performed easily and to circulate quickly. The slogan Akhmat-Sila performs this function for 
Kadyrov and its recursive use creates a consistent index to his model of governance, regime 
sponsored Chechen identity, and memory formation. 
 Consequently, Ramzan Kadyrov’s distortion of these Chechen values could be 
considered a mix between traditional and non-traditional modifications. Kadyrov often uses 
tradition to give agency to new practices, but often are modified to his personal thought on the 
practice. Thus this shuttling between traditional and non-traditional often creates contrasts or 
contradictions, often between competing views on customs. Tovar brings this national identity 
crisis to light, noting that often “… many countries struggle to brand their identities, oscillating 
between their past, which is usually associated with authenticity and nostalgia, and their present 
and future, which are often seen as markers of progression and modernization.”187 Kadyrov 
forgoes full adherence to these values in the Chechen-historical sense, but uses his own 
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personality in tandem with distorted traditional customs to dictate how these values should be 
performed and its circulation to promote his regime.   
Like many other countries, including the United States, Kadyrov created a martyr for the 
region that ultimately became a “super sign,” or as Italian Philosopher Umberto Eco puts it, “a 
potent icon that can circulate poly-contextually,” his late father Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov.188 I will 
state that the super sign of Akhmat-Hadji circulates in all areas of Chechen society, to the point 
where he is sanctified, such as Lenin, Stalin, and other prominent figures in history. This super 
signature of Akhmat-Hadji’s likeness is not only depicted in a physical form, but poly-circulated 
digitally as a slogan, Akhmat-Sila.  
Ethics of Digital Ethnography 
 
Throughout the last decade, many people joined social media not only to stay connected 
with friends or to organize, but to propel their lives. Worldwide, people are online more than 
ever; logging on to attend zoom meetings, lectures, job fairs, work, tele-work, dating, internet-
stalking, surfing the newsfeed, and brand marketing. With an increased presence online comes 
expanded discussions on digital ethics. Previously, many scholars have thought “…digital 
fieldwork is not always practical and ultimately depends on one’s research questions, 
circumstances, and interlocutors.”189 In retrospect, these scholars are correct that all these factors 
decide the pragmatics of digital field sites. Now, due to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2021, 
researchers have never had a more opportune time to dig into digital ethnography 100 percent 
remotely.  
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In my thesis’s context, I will utilize only public facing accounts that can be viewed by 
anyone who is on Instagram and posts that can be found publicly on the timeline. Utilizing only 
public facing accounts means that the profiles used chose not to use privacy settings to restrict 
their content. In light of the current world condition and the greater inability to travel, digital 
fieldwork brings the concern of ethics in a non-physical world that could have real world 
implications. There have been discussions of digital ethics in regards to methods, techniques, and 
collaborative ethnography. Below I will explain further on the digital ethics discussion.  
 Danah Boyd proceeds with caution on digital data collection, noting that online “… what 
is private space and personal expression,” is key for effective ethical navigation, but opaque at 
best.190 Kozinets shines light on the murkiness of the ethical transferability, noting “…there are 
few, if any, ethical procedures for in-person fieldwork that translate easily to the online 
medium.”191 Kozinets’ realization shows that although mankind created the digital realm, most 
researchers are not fully sure what is transferable from previous ethical norms. Linda Seligmann 
and Brian Estes both acknowledge that standard ethical paradigms used before do not fully 
translate to the digital, noting that “Ethical decisions such as disclosure of information and harm 
to persons become ever more complex as well.”192 Today, this complexity is simplified. Public 
information is disseminated to a public(Social media users) and often tagged willfully to 
demonstrate to an audience or be grouped with similarly tagged photos. This circulative attribute 
means anyone with an account for the specific social media platform can view, use, and re-share 
the content. 
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 Continuing to emphasize the modifications needed for each specific project, Seligmann 
and Estes state that techniques and methods “…must be tailored to each study, but might include 
online participant observation; messaging over social media; collecting images, video, and text 
generated or shared by interlocutors; capturing screenshots and chat logs; or the more 
controversial act of “lurking” (passive observation).”193 With various methods that can be 
simultaneously used, choosing the proper collection methods could maximize research and 
develop practices of ethical data collection for future projects to use as a roadmap. My research 
focuses on content collection shared by account holders which is visual and textual in nature.  
James Gibson’s theory of affordances will be used to justify the ethics of what is afforded 
by digital ethnographic methods and the limitations of such research.194 Measures to safeguard 
content and personal identifiable information will be implemented. Affordances can be used to 
navigate ethics in a digital environment. Gibson states that the environment is changed to create 
man’s affordances, “Why has man changed the shapes and substances of his environment? To 
change what it affords him.”195  The collection of available content that is afforded to the 
researcher publicly without crossing into the private sphere is the main goal.  
Applying this idea to Instagram data can help frame the concept in this thesis. Another 
researcher Jessica Lester uses the affordance theory to justify her digital ethnographic work, “ 
Through this screen, they may be afforded access to particular communities’ actions—
synchronously and/or asynchronously.”196 These affordances are imperative for digital fieldwork 
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because it allows the researcher to enter a field site to a community, possibly thousands of miles 
away, and a way to refer back to the data in case of data loss. Another benefit of asynchronous 
collection is that you do not need a (re)authorization to regain the data. Experiencing these 
communities’ actions in a digital public mitigates ethical concerns of what is accessible or not. 
Due to the limitations of screenshots, accidently captured account information not associated 
within the scope of research will be anonymized by photo editing, sanitizing account names, and 
or facial blurring.  
The way Chechen officials, institutions, and residents use Instagram offer an unique view 
of how social media platforms are used within regional and diasporic contexts. One critical view 
of Ramzan Kadyrov’s use is from Tanya Lokshina, stating, “His obsession with social media is 
simple: He likes it, but it also gives him a place to control the news coming from Chechnya for 
the Kremlin, and show people that he’s the boss.”197 The cultural constraints are typical of 
Muslim dominant regions, but have aspects unique to Chechnya, such as Kadyrov’s control over 
the platform(s) within the ethnic population. There is also an observation that the security 
officials (Kadyrovtsy) check young peoples’ phones periodically for undesirable content. 
Sometimes, preferable images are included to bypass gatekeepers. In No Friends But The 
Mountains, Judith Matloff reveals this practice when an interviewee’s phone lit up showing a 
picture of  Kadyrov, with the local journalist defending her action, “I don’t like him” and “It 
helps me with access to authorities.”198 This intrusion of privacy may also lead people who may 
not normally support Kadyrov to have supportive content on their phones in the case of a random 
check.  
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Some additional cultural constraints that can be observed is the modest dress of women, 
no pictures with the opposite sex unless they are family, men working out with their friends, and 
social interactions involving big groups of men while women are in smaller groups. Other 
aspects are pseudonyms instead of names, Islamic themed posts, and veneration of Chechen 
heroes, combat-sport fighters, and Akhmat-Hadji and Ramzan Kadyrov. All of these 
observations are from a general surfing of accounts on the platform from the region and will be 
expanded upon later in chapter 4 of the thesis. Next we will see some methodologies used in 
digital ethnographic studies.  
Digital Ethnographic Methodologies  
 
A decade and a half ago in 2005, virtual researcher Christine Hine showed her unease for 
the new digital frontier, stating that, “Methodological solutions gain much of their authority 
through precedent, and it is not clear as yet just how far the heritage of research methodology 
applies to new media and what gaps in our understanding are still to be exposed.”199 Hine’s 
unease was justifiable, the virtual world of communications was novel, with millions of variables 
still unknown. Could traditional theories be applied in the digital world? What kind of 
modifications need to be made? How credible could online research be? What new issues will 
arise? These questions that arose to navigate the web were needed to help “understand this 
changing, increasingly digitized society.”200 
Now, 15 years since Virtual Methods: Issues in Social Research on the Internet, the 
international digital landscape has fundamentally changed. Now, Hine acknowledges and 
understands that this new realm of digital society is “embedded, embodied, and 
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everyday[sic].”201 Andreas Bernard links Hine’s thought with his own theory, that the 
intertextual nature of the hashtag sits between, “text and metatext, and it draws the previously 
hidden steps of cataloging and indexing out into the open.”202 The relevance of embedded 
intertextual activity is present in both authors’ comments, but expressed differently. These 
expressions can both serve to explain Chechen digital society and the circulation of Akhmat-Sila 
on Instagram through hashtags, post text, and profile signs related to the slogan that can be 
indexical of certain Chechen groups. Although much of the digital landscape has evolved 
immensely, at the beginning of the 2010s, social media platforms were still in their infancy and 
their parent companies had just discovered a way to have personal cellular device access. In 
some countries, you still had to log-on to your account (Facebook, Myspace, or Instagram at the 
time)from a personal desktop, laptop, or make a trip to the internet café. However, with the 
proliferation of the smart phone worldwide, device prices dropped and mobile social media use 
escalated and social networks broadened  in “emerging economies.”203  
In 2007, Danah Boyd raised the question of social media with her research on “Online 
Social Networks” which laid the foundation for works in digital ethnography and as an heuristic 
for the term social media and the history of it prior to 2007.204 This paper helped further research 
in the field. In one of the earliest studies of a contemporary social media platform, in Tales From 
Facebook, Daniel Miller constructs a two part book, the first part laying out case studies 
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conducted while in Trinidad and the second part emphasizing the anthropology of the social 
media platform in the Trinidadian context in December 2009 to January 2010.  In short, Miller 
explores and adds the idea of “ethnographically situational awareness” of various sites in the 
field on and offline.205  
 Miller cautions that although people use Facebook for various reasons, much cannot be 
seen when users go offline. He uses various case studies to prove his argument, and how social 
media can be enabling or disabling to the user.206 In one case study where Miller explains how 
certain intimate media was exposed on Facebook or what Trinidadians coined as Fasbook, Miller 
revealed a key facet to privacy with Josanne’s sex tape leak, “No one was hurt in making this 
tape; many people were greatly hurt by its exposure. So, at least for a liberal ethics based on 
avoidance of harm, the problem is its dissemination, not its production.”207  So, the content made 
is not the problem, it is how it circulates.  Since Miller wrote this particular work, there has been 
advancements in terms of technology and the variety of social media platforms available and 
their capabilities, also to include ways to take down such content. However, for Miller to conduct 
his research, he still required in-person fieldwork to get a holistic view on the offline culture that 
influenced the online. 
 In a 2014 Digital Ethnography It’s Complicated, Danah Boyd explores the social media 
use of high school students at a particular school and the “networked publics” that have seemed 
to develop around offline-world lines. Boyd fleshes out her argument with 8 aspects of social 
media: identity, privacy, addiction, danger, bullying, inequality, literacy, and searching for a 
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public of their own. One main theme Boyd points out is that social media is “public by default, 
private through effort.”208 This notion of what constitutes a public sphere is important and often 
needs a definition to give a sort of structure to give an affordance, perceived affordance, or 
constraints. For research, what constitutes a public sphere is important for Institutional Review 
Boards and or needing approval for interviews with subjects online if your content reaches into 
private domains. On the other hand, if this individual posts a comment on a picture or posts a 
picture, that would be considered public, not private like Instagram’s direct message feature. 
Depending where you draw the line of consent, it could be when your message is accepted by the 
receiver or when you formally ask the participant for consent.  
 In Visualising Facebook: A Comparative Perspective Daniel Miller and Jolynna Sinanan 
conduct a comparative study between Facebook posts between English and Trinidadian mothers 
in their respective countries and how they respond to similar life events in their own 
“bubbles.”209 Much of what Miller and Sinanan do is produce a qualitative answer to a 
quantitative collection of 20,000 posted images and how they must be interpreted within their 
respective local contexts and how local customs and “generalized cultural norms” control on 
what is posted and how it is perceived online.210 Miller also underscores that in his previous 
work Tales of Facebook that he did “not include one single image,” primarily due to publisher 
angst and the cost of printing color visuals.211 Another criticism Miller received on his previous 
work was merely for the fact that he did his social media study in Trinidad as if the region was 
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more important than others, when in reality it is just within Miller’s area of expertise and thus 
making Trinidad and ideal area to conduct his research and its uniqueness.  
Sinanan is also a prominent digital ethnographer, in which she did her monograph in the 
same geographical area as Miller, but more specifically for the location of El Mirador, Trinidad 
while Miller tackled the other half of the comparative study in The Glades in South East 
England. The study was conducted ethnographically and basically, wading through mass 
amounts of photos and selfies, “With respect to identifying larger patterns of posting, our main 
approach was simply to stare at thousands of visual postings and try and identify repetition and 
genres,” which seems to be an effective way to gauge visual culture and identify cultural 
nuances, indexical signs, and semiotic devices.212 This method ultimately influences my research 
for the fact there are millions of photos in circulation. Miller and Sinanan also go for footnotes 
rather than in-text citation so the reading public that will be included will be broader in scope, 
rather than just catering to an academic public, but of course includes relevant research data to 
give backing to the accessible writing style. Nevertheless, Miller and Sinanan both acknowledge 
the scope of their research and how their findings only contribute to a particular gap among 
many to be discovered.  
Scope of Research  
 
Much of these digital ethnographic methods explained above create a collection of unique 
monographs that can give a holistic view of social media utilization around the world and the 
uniqueness of each region’s cultural adaptations of a platform, leading to emic themes and trends 
in the data. In addition, the methodologies above give a framework to explore the realm of visual 
culture in social media. However, much of the data collected also had a physical in-person 
                                               




component to collect said data, leaving much to the imagination to what and how much can be 
explored on just a sole digital platform for the exploration of such trends or phenomena in 
culturally specific social media bubbles. Now, given that much of the research conducted since 
March 2020 has occurred during the Worldwide Covid-19 Pandemic, the in-person aspect to 
much digital ethnographic field work has been restricted to the home nation of the researcher due 
to land border closures, strict entry requirements, or just plain denial of entry to foreigners to the 
research region.  
 In the scope of my thesis I only hope to conduct a phenomenological analysis to explore 
a small ethnic world on Instagram I would like to call “Ramzan’s Instagram Culture and Identity 
of Chechnya.” In this realm I will explore identity/local/nation/social media branding or a sort of 
combination of the mentioned types due to many aspects overlapping each other. 
Phenomenological analysis seems to fit the proliferation of Akhmat-Sila in visual culture and 
discourse best because you can include other types of analysis such as narrative, case-study, and 
of course digital ethnography being the overall method.  
This view does not mean you cannot conduct a similar analysis within a different scope 
but rather my choice. In addition, this research does not pertain to all Chechens who identify 
with the slogan but rather only gives an insight to an aspect that circulates within the culture 
itself. Just as in all societies on an offline, some people may demonstrate a particular utterance or 
practice while others do not. Another aspect of this research is that it will only explore the digital 
sphere on social media and no in-person research or interactions, similar to the fly on the wall 
observer approach, given the limitations and other cultural/political factors that make in-person 





Chapter 4: Research of Ramzan Kadyrov’s Slogan Akhmat-Sila 
 
The research conducted on Ramzan Kadyrov and his model for Chechen identity and the  
phenomenon of the indexical slogan, Akhmat-Sila, is a collection of screen shots from Chechen-
related government/personal accounts, articles, YouTube videos, news, and other forms of media 
that will span more or a less a 4  year period where the slogan Akhmat-Sila is imagined, used, 
praised, or criticized. Of course to find many of these screenshots that have value, thousands had 
to be sifted through. I will not quantify them due to the massive amount of data available, but 
only note a few trends below to coincide with Akhmat-Sila. The slogan Akhmat-Sila will be seen 
circulated in digital and physical formats in public spheres orally, visually, and textually.  
  Sometimes, only the word Akhmat will be present in said forms but falls under as an 
aspect of the slogan. The evidence will be ordered more or less thematically to group similar sets 
of data together. Although there are thousands of photos, this is qualitative data meant to sum up 
the solgan’s significance. So, any numerical data will only be added to show growth and not 
analytical quantitative data. The primary focus will be Instagram and other forms of media will 
be used to help weave a narrative that can help explain this phenomenon. One affordance of this 
type of research is that the data is often available asynchronously and does not require real time 
collection. Some of the research topic’s limitations arise from inevitable factors in social media 
with an authoritarian strongman, the loss of data due to account closures.  
Akhmat-Sila Origins 
 
  Since Kadyrov’s first Instagram, @Kadyrov_95,  was shut down due to the December 
23rd, 2017 U.S. sanctions, prompting Instagram to boot him off the platform, it is difficult to 
know how far Akhmat-Sila goes back on the Instagram record holistically. Fortunately, some of 




share some of Kadyrov’s content and their own original demonstrations of the slogan, emerging 
somewhere around the spring of 2017. Kadyrov’s commander of the Kadyrovtsy, Zamid Chelaev 
has one of the earliest post using the slogan. On March 16th, 2017 in figure 4.1, Chelaev used the 
slogan to show praise to the SOBR Terek commander Abuzaid Vismuradov.213 We can assume 
that the slogan was not in circulation too far before then. The earliest origins of the slogan in 
music seems to have emerged with Timati’s song “Grozny” in late 2018. As of today, January 
19th, 2021, the slogan is now hash-tagged 128,975 times on Instagram under #ахматсила alone. 
However, the slogan is not only restricted to the hashtag. Below will be some occurrences of the 
slogan before the first sanction, some photos will be curated to avoid redundancy but 
nevertheless, contained the slogan textually or visually: 
                Figure 4.1 
 
              The earliest found textual evidence of Akhmat-Sila before U.S. Sanctions, March 16th, 2017.  
              Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/BRs95BRhnAu/. 
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In figure 4.1 you can see in the main post comment that Akhmat-Sila is not yet a hashtag, 
but is grouped with hashtags such as #чечня, #грозный, and #патриот giving an idea of what 
the slogan encapsulates. The visual representation to go with the text is Vismuradov in 
traditional attire. Most notable articles are the Cherkesska tunic with cartridge holders on the 
chest and a sheep skin papakha, referring back to 19th century Chechen male dress.  
Figure 4.2 
 
A Unique variation of the slogan, April 16th, 2017. Akhmat is also presented twice visually. 
Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/BS9YAjFBFUt/  
 
Above in figure 4.2, Zamid Chelaev’s comment adds content connected to the slogan 
Akhmat-Sila. Not only is the slogan mentioned with a triumphant Kadyrov, but is linked with 
other words often used in Chechnya to praise God and to signify who is the leader.214 In the 
comments section, two out of the three visible comments signal to other regime supporters with 
the number 95. The middle commenter likens the photo as a praise to God, writing “Allahu-
Akbar” along with a prayer hand and pointing up emoji.   
                                               






June 19th, 2017. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/BVh_zTxhuF2/  
 
Above in figure 4.3, a visual of what Akhmat-Sila signifies (Ramzan’s Chechnya) and 
what it does not, the Chechen identity imaginaries of former rebel leader Shamil Basayev and 
former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov that led to turmoil with Russia. Referring back to 
Chapter one, Akhmad-Hadji’s power grab ultimately pushed these former Chechen commanders 
to the side of the enemies of the Russian state. The screenshot shows how under Ramzan’s pious 
rule with Russian funding that religion, new infrastructure, and peace is present. The latter part 
of the figure demonstrates what Maskhadov’s and Basayev’s control brought to Chechnya: war, 
outside Salafi Islamic practices, and decay.   
Figure 4.4 
 
Translation: “The whole Benoy and Benovites are for Ramzan, and who is against this is our common 





Above, Figure 4.4 demonstrates how Akhmat-Sila is tied to Kadyrov’s teip, the Benoy. 
By far the largest and most powerful teip in the region, Kadyrov makes sure to demonstration a 
successful pose for his blood relatives. The Kadyrovtsy commander Zamid Chelaev also shares 
the photo, showing its recirculation. Kadyrov’s branded apparel is stamped with his father’s 
name on the sweater and on the championship fight belt. Two out of the three commenters also 
have signs indexical to Kadyrov’s rule. The first commenter has the license plate code 95 in his 
Instagram name, which signifies Chechnya, and the second account demonstrates similar support 
with “za kra” and 95 included.  
Figure 4.5 
 
   Vismuradov with MMA Akhmat fight club fighters, holding a Russian flag joined with a Chechen flag 
with Akhmat-Hadji’s likeness on it, demonstration how one cannot be without the other. September 2nd, 
2017.  Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/BYiKPYZBn-N/  
 
Another show of recirculation, figure 4.5 shows that Abuzaid Vismuradov first circulated 
this video of a group of boxers chanting Akhmat-Sila while also holding a banner of two 
conjoined flags. The post was then shared again by the Kadyrovtsy commander. The Chechen 
flag with Akhmat-Hadji’s image and the Russian flag with the double-headed eagle imprinted on 
it highlights the partnership that Russia and Chechnya now hold today due to Akhmad-Hadji’s 




Hadji’s image. Akhmat is found again on apparel, this time on a sports cap on Vismuradov’s 
head. Akhmat-Sila, not yet a hashtag, is found as regular commentary on the text area of the 
post. 
Abdul-Kerim Edilov: Akhmat-Sila’s Ideal 
 
Figure 4.6  
 
Evidence showing who embodies the slogan Akhmat-Sila, UFC fighter Abdul-Kerim Edilov, with the post 
saying “Here is the evidence that Fight Club Akhmat-Sila Allahu-Akbar.” September 2nd 2017.  
Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/BYjGXG1hMKe/  
 
Above in figure 4.6, Abdul-Kerim Edilov is one of Chechnya’s first prized international 
fighters and one of the very few to fight in the UFC. Edilov was also one of Kadyrov’s fighters 
from the pre-sanction era. He fought hard and rarely lost with a 17-4 overall record. However, 
according to Zidan Karim, he was released from his UFC contract due to an altercation he had 
with a journalist while in Chechnya.215 Regardless, he is under the patronage and gainfully 
employed under Kadyrov, even if it seems he is not officially in a competing capacity.216 We can 
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be assured also that Edilov’s fighting career is not finished, but only in a low period where he 
can train and better himself to better represent his patron and all that encompasses Akhmat-Sila 
for greater glory. 
 In figure 4.6 Edilov’s importance as a Chechen prize fighter is evident, with the 
Kadyrovtsy commander posting a photo montage of the fighter’s greatness for Akhmat-Fight 
Clubs. Edilov is the embodiment of Akhmat-Sila by performing the modern Chechen warrior 
ideal as a competitive fighter. The comments section also shows supporters giving praise with 
the signs 95 and “za kra” in their account names again. This repetitiveness starts to develop a 
pattern in Chechnya where Akhmat-Sila, Za Kra, and 95 are all associated with each other. Even 
in the likes count you can see the most recent like was from a account holder with these two 
signs included in the name.  
Figure 4.7 
 
Translation: “Many ask the question, what signifies the expression Akhmat Sila? But often they understand 
this expression incorrectly. Akhmat-Sila, this is not only a phenomenon of strength, this expression 





In figure 4.7, we finally find a definition of what Akhmat-Sila means to the local soccer 
team and more broadly of what the definition consists of. We can notice that the definition 
references to Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov’s work and all that came after his 2004 death, to explain 
the renaming of the soccer team from FC Terek to FC Akhmat. Chelaev also adds an explanation 
to mitigate the ideas others may have had of the slogan’s meaning or what it consists of. 
However, this definition only describes the overall significance of Akhmat-Sila with the slogan’s 
face, the likeness Akhmad-Haji and his past works. The slogan in this instance performs as a 
visual memorial to a Chechen Martyr. The team aspect of the definition could be referred to the 
soccer team, or it can refer to the Akhmad-Hadji’s former entourage who sided with him and are 
in power now with his son, Ramzan. Akhmad-Hadji is also referred to as “Hero of Russia,” 
which is the highest honor in Russia for service to the nation and its people.217 A main difference 
here is that Akhmad-Hadji is labeled this with first president preceding it, referring to Putin. 
Thus, the slogan here includes recent history and is an evolving term as its popularity, usage, and 














                                               




Fight Celebrities and The Slogan 
 
Figure 4.8  
  
 
November 28th, 2017. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/BcLHor4BOrh/  
 
Many people may wonder of Kadyrov’s fascination with some of the biggest names in 
combat-sports history. Well, these associations are all a part to give his regime and fight clubs 
credibility. Figure 4.8 depicts 3 screenshots, focusing on the visual rather than textual evidence 
in the comment box. The first photo shows Mike Tyson chanting “Akhmat-Sila” with his 
sponsor in Chechnya, thus demonstrating that even fight legends are using the slogan. Pointing 
the figure upward also demonstrates that the slogan refers to God, showing the slogan’s 
connection to religion. The bottom photo also shows a video screenshot of Tyson with Kadyrov 
in his palace, demonstrating the Chechen leader’s closeness to the highest echelons of the fight 
world by touching Tyson while wearing a sports jacket with Akhmat-Sila stitched on the front. In 




custom of hospitality. Towards the end of the visit the video shows Tyson signing Kadyrov’s 
sweater as a signature of approval.  
Floyd Mayweather, the world’s highest paid combat-sport fighter and all time boxing 
legend is also given a royal entrance by Kadyrov into Chechnya. On December 9th, 2017, 
Chechens waited outside in the snow for hours at Grozny airport, chanting Akhmat-Sila before 
Mayweather arrived and while he disembarked the plane.218 Not only is Kadyrov also wearing 
Akhmat-Sila branded apparel, but gave Mayweather a hat with the Akhmat-Fight Club symbol 
on it. Kadyrov is associating his brand with the biggest names in the fighting world and 
simultaneously giving them his brand merchandise. Mayweather also attended some events in 
Kadyrov’s fight leagues, giving his leagues a sense of legitimacy.219 Mayweather was so smitten 
with Kadyrov, that Mayweather declared “ If I got Russian citizenship, I would have a place in 
Moscow and I would have a house in Chechnya…both!”220 This declaration from Mayweather 
gives Kadyrov’s followers a boost, knowing that a World champion would want to live among 
them, the land of fighters. Their meeting concludes by chanting Akhmat-Sila all together while 
Kadyrov walks Mayweather out. The cult of the warrior is strong in Chechnya, and it is only 
amplified by these high profile visits, warp-speed developments in Kadyrov’s personal fight club 
enterprises, and the elevation of ambitious young Chechens to the highest levels possible. 
Akhmat-Sila represents this warrior paradigm. 
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Ramzan Kadyrov and Instagram after 2017 Sanctions  
 
Entourage Accounts  
 
After the first line of U.S. imposed sanctions in late December 2017 to the last set of 
imposed sanctions in 2020, Ramzan Kadyrov seemed to have a few doppelganger accounts, 
many of which relayed or posted his content from Telegram. Although Telegram stores a wealth 
of information on Kadyrov’s current personal free range account usage, it is not within the scope 
of this current research and is an area that will need to be expanded upon in the future. Another 
social media area to explore would be Kadyrov’s Chechen developed Mylistory, a Chechen 
version of Instagram, Ran by the Chechen government and rumored to be used as a propaganda 
outlet.221 However, the security of Mylistory is questionable and possibly needs a brave soul and 
a burner phone.222 His entourage would need to be included too. The last Kadyrov account to be 
hit by the May 2020 U.S. Sanctions was @Kadyrov._95. Kadyrov’s right hand men were also 
blocked to include his cousin Adam Delimkhanov, Magomed Daudov(Lord), and Abuzaid 
Vismuradov(Patriot).223 The blocked pages that can be found are below:  
Figure 4. 9 
 
Doppelganger account that was closed under U.S. Sanctions. May, 14th, 2020. Source: 
www.Instagram.com/Kadyrov._95/  
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Adam Delimkhanov’s account afterward. May 14th, 2020. Source: www.instagram.com/delimkhanov95/  
 
The “page not available links” un figure 4.9 and 4.10 are also present for Magomed 
Daudov(Lord) and Abuzaid Vismuradov(Patriot). I have found their new active accounts but 
they will remain only as long as they are not discovered by U.S. sanction officers. There is also 
the possibility that they were able to change some parts of their account names before sanctions 
hit, thus preserving their accounts. According to the amount of followers for the following 
accounts, a sizable portion of the population follows them: 
Figure 4.11 
 
The new account of Parliamentarian Adam Delimkhanov. As per proper procedure, there is a picture of 
Ramzan Kadyrov and his father, Akhmat-Hadji. His Telegram link is included. Maybe the U.S. Treasury 




The account of Chechen Parliamentarian Magomed Daudov. The amount of shared followed accounts, 
amount of followers, and the blue verification sign lead to legitimacy. The first post is also from early 








Vismuradov’s page. The super signage of Akhmat-Hadji, slogan signaling, and Islamic saying are common 
in Chechen government profiles. Another aspect mentioned earlier in Chapter 4 that is entirely Russian, the 













The Kadyrovtsy Commander Page. He has had the most extensive Instagram history ranging all the way 






In figures 4.11 through 4.16 from just looking at the headings on the pages of Ramzan’s 
entourage and supporting forces, the average person can identify a few themes. The main theme 
seen in almost all of them is the image of the late Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov. Excluding SOBR 
Terek, the elder Kadyrov’s image takes the place of the default photo, sometimes paired with his 
son, Ramzan. On Delimkhanov’s default photo, Ramzan and Akhmat-Hadji are depicted in 
classic Chechen attire on horses, with the elder Kadyrov’s likeness painted in the historic 
imaginary of the Caucasian heroes of centuries past, such as Imam Shamil.  
Semantic and Semiotic Devices  
 
 Other forms of signs indexical of Chechen identity can be paired or similar in 
significance to Akhmat-Sila. One such sign is the Za KRA, which can often be seen on many 
Chechen Instagram accounts, but is more prevalent for government functionaries. This pairing 
means “For Kadyrov Ramzan Akhmatovich,” which ultimately shows support for the current 
leadership and their status with Kadyrov or any of his extensions of power within the greater 
Russian Federation. This signification also acts as a sort of diplomatic immunity out of the 
region, with the FSB reluctant to pursue any suspected license plates with those specific letters, 
often attached with Chechnya’s regional tag number, 95. Pairing this information with what is 
found in this FP article, “KRA-marked Porches and Lexuses” often drive around with impunity 
from the local traffic enforcement in Chechnya and more of these tagged luxury cars have been 
found running around Moscow.224 So, not only does Akhmat-Sila project strength, but also a 
social status that is above Russian federal law.  
                                               





 Another significant aspect of figure 4.17 below are the words “polk” and “pekhota.” In 
Russian, these words mean “regiment” and “foot soldier” respectively, referring to the 
Kadyrovtsy and their members. The members, of course found a way to identify each other, 
having these specific keywords attached to their Instagram accounts. You can easily identity who 
are members of the special police force or any other local group really by simply typing 
“a.a.kadyrova, polk kadyrova, or “пехота кра” and more than a handful of accounts will come 
up.  
The linkage does not stop there, once Ахмат Сила is put in the search query you can see 
that there are various forms of the same keyword, sometimes crisscrossing at the bottom of 
figure 4.17 with a “za_kra_95” coming up at the middle-bottom of first 5 profiles to pop up. 
There are more similar profiles that appear once you scroll down to include some that are not 
relevant to the discussion. However, the limitations of the screen shot are apparent and would 
require multiple screen shots of a redundancy that can be displayed with a sample, keeping the 
same significance:  
Figure 4.17                                                             
  




In addition, the “KRA factor” has a broader significance.225 Tanya Lokot mentions in her 
blog that Novaya Gazeta Reporter Yelena Milashina not only recognizes KRA as a signifier, but 
also as a systematic way to control the Chechen internet/social media space. Milashina goes into 
detail how the KRA factor came to be. Milashina includes some screenshots of Kadyrov’s and 
Magomed Daudov’s original Instagram bullying tactics used to intimidate critics in and outside 
the region to retract what they said or be silenced. The Chechen government had a website 
dedicated to outlining the factors that make up KRA’s significance at www.factorkra.ru, but has 
been shut down. Due to this page shutdown, I cannot tell you what I saw on the page of the 
factors that constituted the KRA method.  
Fortunately, Lokot’s repost her blog of Milashina’s 2016 article providing a copy of the 
information, because the original article is now missing in the hyperlink.226 The factors that 
Milashina had originally wrote what she saw on the KRA website that Lokot translated seemed 
on the ideological side: 
– “the most creative and effective factor for strengthening the state system of the Russian 
Federation”; 
– “the only efficient way of fighting international terrorism in global practice”; 
– “the only hope of the Chechen people”; 
– “a faithful associate of the President and Commander in Chief of Russia, who, in these 
difficult days, […] proves his constant readiness to perform the assigned tasks in any part 
of the global geopolitical space, should such an order be given.227  
 
From what Lokot relayed from Milashina’s Novaya Gazeta article, the aspects of the KRA factor 
align with a Pro-Russian/Pro-Kadyrov regime of internet control, which is encapsulated in the 
slogan Akhmat-Sila and often used together to enhance loyalty to Kadyrov. The KRA factor acts 
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as an ideological method to control critics, which are often those who do not agree with Kadyrov 
or his slogan Akhmat-Sila.  
Around the same time as the May 2020 sanctions were implemented, a Grozny online 
news outlet posted a video of Ramzan Kadyrov explaining what Akhmat-Sila means. Kadyrov’s 
personal definition of the slogan does not stray from what was said from the Kadyrovtsy 
Commander Chelaev, but with the addition of why allahu-akbar is often added in conjunction 
with the slogan:228 
 When we say "Akhmat-Power", some say: "Allah-Power". Allah Almighty is 
Almighty! But people can also have strength. But in this case we mean the path of 
Akhmat-Hadji and those who follow this path. When we say “Akhmat-Power” we always 
add “Allahu Akbar”, glorifying the Almighty Creator and ask for help from him, - 
concluded the head of the republic.229 
 
In Chelaev’s explanation of Akhmat-Sila, he mentions Akhmad-Hadji’s path. This path is 
the ideological path he took when he sided with the Russian Federation during the Chechen 
Wars, leading to the creation of a New Chechnya. This path also likens Akmad-Hadji to a saint, 
taking the holy road for his people, with his disciples following the trail he treaded. In addition, 
with Kadyrov’s definition included, we can now make more sense on why allahu-akbar is added 
with almost every Akhmat-Sila. This  phenomenon is seen in various comments on his former 
Kadyrov._95 profile. Kadyrov is engaging in facework to not upset some of his more religious 
followers and had to re-contextualize the slogan’s position within the realm of Sufi Islam and its 
more adherent practitioners. Unfortunately, the Kadyrov._95 data regarding his original posts 
performing this facework was lost in the May 2020 sanctions. Luckily, the slogan’s proliferation 
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with the religious auxiliary can be found on Instagram through hashtags, visuals, and embedding 
in posts throughout his entourage, security forces, fighters, and supporters. However, not all 
Chechens recirculate the slogan, but criticize it.  
Musa Lomaev: Akhmat-Sila Critic 
 
 Over the last year there has been push back to Kadyrov’s slogan, but the criticism can be 
very hard to maintain in the virtual world. A Second Chechen War refugee and an ardent regime 
critic, Musa Lomaev considers Akhmat-Sila not Chechen at all, but rather a cliché. 
Unfortunately, Lomaev’s original video on Akhmat-Sila was taken offline just recently early in 
mid-January 2021 and has asked kindly of all who have his videos saved to “delete them.”230 
This erasure of data is due to a failed Kadyrov-backed assassination attempt with a “half a 
million US dollars for Lomaev's head” from the Chechen government, leading to more backlash 
for keeping the mocking videos up.231 This failed attempt to end Lomaev’s life created problems 
for his family members still living in Chechnya and caused him to take measures to protect them 
from unwanted violence.  
 Fortunately, one of Lomaev’s followers previously posted the Akhmat-Sila criticism 
video on his own personal channel describing how the slogan is not Chechen with Lomaev’s 
original link to the video, which is now defunct. Keep in mind, that the following video will 
possibly go down soon in response to Lomaev’s wishes to remove all content for the sake of his 
family still in Chechnya. The screenshot included will also be used as a heuristic in case it does 
go down and will be carefully displayed and elaborated on.  In the figure below Lomaev 
criticizes the slogan as being a cowardly slogan: 
                                               
230 YouTube TV Caucasus. Musa Lomaev Asks to Delete All His Videos (2021), 2021. 
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Lomaev elaborates on the fallacies of the slogan in Chechen society. Notice the General Dudayev icon in 
the top right corner, an obvious show of where Lomaev ideologically stands, for a free, traditional, and 
independent Chechnya. Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qKScVD4K6gA  
 
In figure 4.18, Lomaev’s criticism of Akhmat-Sila is imperative for that fact that not only 
that it is one of the only known recorded public criticisms of the slogan, but that he lets other 
young Chechens know that the slogan “is a justification of the genocide of the Chechen people in 
1944.”232 Not only does Lomaev add a painful historical Chechen collective memory from era’s 
past, but adds on recent Chechen history. Lomaev utilizes a recent Chechen collective memory 
similar to Akhmat-Sila’s usage. Lomaev uses pathos in a way that contradicts the Kadyrov 
regime’s view, saying the slogan means that they approve of the pains of the Chechen wars for 
every “zachistka,”233 every tear their mothers and sisters felt, and every pain the Chechen people 
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felt in then and that some continue to feel after the wars. Lomaev continues to preach on what is 
important in life(freedom) to his young Chechen listeners, noting that all things in life change, 
just like the traditional academic social mobility the Soviet Union offered to Chechens that now 
ceases to exists, and when the Russian regime falls that the material riches of Kadyrov’s regime 
will not continue.  
 Lomaev’s perspective on the slogan offers a counter-weight in a sea of Kadyrov’s 
influence, which dominates Chechnya and the only one with impunity to any sort of check. 
Lomaev also offers an outlier in the significance of Akhmat-Sila and the collective memory that 
it entails to Chechen society. Consequently, Kadyrov is still able to strong arm a critic with his 
abusive power and still manage to get what he desires, silence. Kadyrov himself though, loves to 
speak, and Kadyrov will go to many lengths to get on social media, even if it means posing as a 
tourism site. 
Kadyrov’s Current Account 
 
  One account can be assured as Kadyrov’s, @ya_pomoshnik_kra_95. This account first 
received attention in a Russian Sports News outlet, when MMA middleweight Chechen-Swedish 
fighter Khamzat Chimaev visited the homeland and was recorded play fighting with Kadyrov’s 
son.234  The article states that Kadyrov wrote it on the Instagram account, underscoring how it is 
possible to be a true Chechen away from the region, “Friends, Khamzat Chimaev’s visit to the 
republic has demonstrated that you can remain a real Chechen, living thousands of kilometers 
from Daimokhk, if you have a desire and correct upbringing.”235 This is a form of Kadyrov’s 
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patronage and acceptance to young people who display Checheness in a way that correlates to 
his ideal on the international stage. This ideal is primarily concerned with personal conduct and 
in that in the octagon/ring as a warrior, a personage worthy of the slogan, Akhmat-Sila. Also, the 
amount of hashtags for Akhmat-Sila increased by 10,694 posts since the last time counted 
towards the end of January 2021. The current date at this point is February 22nd, 2021. Below in 
figure 4.19 is Kadyrov’s account: 
Figure 4.19 
 
Source: www.instagram.com/ya_pomoshnik_kra_95    
 
Upon further investigation, the page at first sight appears to be a tourist page, but can be 
accurately identified as Kadyrov’s profile due to the amount of contacts in common, followers, 
and the recirculated tagged posts with this profile as the official Kadyrov account. There are 
many followers in common, bringing to about 82 contacts, many of which are Chechen 
government officials and or extensions of the armed forces, administration, or fight clubs. The 
official tourist website in the account bio is in line with positive local branding, demonstrating 
that Chechnya is open to the possibility of foreigners coming to see the region, more than likely 
to add to Kadyrov’s credibility that Chechnya has reached a level of security it has never seen 
before. The Arabic inscription on the default photo means “God,” or Allah in pronunciation. 
 Kadyrov’s nephew, Khamzat Kadyrov, gives legitimacy that this page is Kadyrov’s 




links Kadyrov to this account with a hyperlink tag to the profile, connecting the strongman to the 
account. This linkage in figure 4.20 is important because Khamzat, although in all technicalities 
Kadyrov’s nephew, is his adopted son since Zelimkhan, Kadyrov’s older brother, was killed in 




January 19th, 2020.  Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CKOgSt6Dbi_/  
 
Not only in figure 4.20 above but through Khamzat’s Instagram account, you can see 
similar linkages to his uncle/adopted father throughout his entire profile.236 Although Khamzat’s 
posting frequency is less than others within the regime circle, he actively displays his 
involvement in local government life, shooting at the Russian Special Forces university, 
engaging in sport with emphasis on the combat variety, homage to his uncle, and of course the 
image of his grand-father Akhmad-Hadji on material items and posts.  
                                               





Following this Instagram account confirmation, we can enter the linked post on the 
Russian sports outlet to view the Instagram account with Kadyrov’s idealization of Chimaev’s 
Chechen upbringing in its entirety: 
Figure 4.21 
Khamzat Chimaev play fighting with Ramzan’s son, displaying Chechen values. January 13th, 2021.  
 
@ya_pomoshnik_kra_95’s comment can be translated as: 
Friends, the visit of Khamzat Chimaev to the republic demonstrated that you can remain 
a real Chechen, living thousands of kilometers from Daimokhk, there was a desire and 
proper upbringing[sic]. Khamzat knows how to behave according to Chechen etiquette 
both with adults and with youngsters. He is tactful, obscure, but interesting and 
charismatic. In a few days, he visited schools and sports sections of the republic, talked 
with thousands of young people, encouraging young people to win and achieve high 
results. He left behind a fantastic experience and a boost of energy. Probably, it is for 
such natural qualities that his fans love him not only in Chechnya, but also far beyond its 
borders. I am sure that the main victories of Khamzat are still ahead, and he will 
definitely please us with beautiful and bright endings of the fights. We believe in you, 
Khamzat! Akhmat-Power!237 
 
With this quote in figure 4.21, we can see Kadyrov’s elevation of his ideal form of 
Chechen identity to the international stage. This pedestaling is important because Kadyrov’s 
                                               




praise of a fellow successful Chechen who maintained his values leads to effective branding of 
Chimaev by associating good morals and upbringing with his slogan, Akhmat-Sila. This 
association of morals with the slogan also give a physical representation of the slogan, a point 
where supporters can look up to and see what can be reached, giving a positive connotation to 
many looking to lead a successful life in the Chechen sense. This successful life could be 
obtained through service in the regime, enlistment in the armed forces, or becoming a prize 
fighter in one of Kadyrov’s fight clubs. In addition, Chimaev’s displacement from the region also 
demonstrates that the slogan is not localized. However, this current example is just to give a 
preview of how the slogan has developed. To provide more background of Akhmat-Sila’s spread 
in popular culture across the Russo-Islamic sphere, we will examine a song where Akhmat-Sila 
is quite prevalent.  
Timati’s Song “Grozny” 
 
Timati, formally known as Timur Ildarovich Yunusov, is a Russian rap artist. Timati was 
born to a Tartar father and a Jewish mother. Known for propagandistic music, Timati has often 
praised Putin and Russia in a few songs, most notably in “My Best Friend is President Putin,” 
which echoes Timati’s support of the regime and “Moskva,” which praises the city and its 
government, received public backlash for not supporting anti-government protests.238 Scout Mills 
delves further into Timati’s importance to the rebranding of Russia and expanding his own 
personal brand, Black Star.239 Mills underscores that Timati is so important for promoting 
contemporary Russian culture that the Russian Orthodox Church wanted him to push their 
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agenda of having young people listen to classic Russian texts through modern vocals, as 
Metropolitan Tikhon states:  
Этот год мы хотим посвятить русской классике, пригласить самые популярные 
ансамбли и исполнителей. Например, если бы группа «Ленинград» исполнила 
какую-нибудь песню на стихи Пушкина, Лермонтова, Тютчева и так далее, это бы 
возмутило одно поколение, но это бы услышало другое. Каких-то еще 
исполнителей [можно привлечь], Тимати например.240 241 
 
 The praise does not only stop there, it extends much further south to Grozny to Putin’s right 
hand man, Chechen Strongman Ramzan Kadyrov.  Here, we will start on the journey of how 
Akhmat-Sila became to be and is now circulated orally and textually, digitally online and offline. 
Below, is the cover for the song “Grozny.” One noticeable feature is that Timati goes by another 
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This alias in figure 4.22 could be used to delineate the song from the wider Russian 
crowds who may disapprove of the song. But, if one knows the Chechen world of Instagram, 
Benoevsky is a name that signals to the Benoi teip in Chechnya. Other than the change up in 
Timati’s alias to signal to Kadyrov’s clan, the lyrics in the song emphasizes Grozny as this city 
home to a benevolent leader with heroes and history. The translated lyrics go like this:242  
1st Couplet: Assalam aleikum, transit Moscow to Grozny  
Half month in the sky, serious conversation And this bit of the column blows to pieces 
24/7 Timur Benoevsky Who does not understand, he will understand - no question 
 Who should I be afraid of in the forest, if I am a greyhound(wolf) with these kind of 
strikes, fate does not wear  
With brothers ahead, Akhmat strength! 
 
Chorus: And it was no coincidence then that the stars converged.  
But what is this empty talk? I was born in Grozny. 
 Now, in life, the horseman acts beautifully.  
You hear, this is the Caucasus, 
 Akhmat is power! 
 
 A proud, confident look, a serious attitude. 
 Welcome to our city of Grozny. Now, a horseman does beautifully in life.  
You hear, this is the Caucasus,  
Akhmat is power! 
 
The second verse: Timur Benoevsky Gudermes raises his hands with me 
 The boys in Shali know these sounds 
 From Urus Martan Argun Veduchi  
They know these texts, all the bearded men  
Yes, this is Russia, this is the city of Grozny  
He is for the strong in spirit  
This is a serious approach 
 Welcome home, as Ramzan says. worthy, strengthen the Imam 
 
Chorus: And it was no coincidence then that the stars converged.  
But what is this empty talk? I was born in Grozny. 
 Now, in life, a horseman acts beautifully.  
You hear, this is the Caucasus,  
Akhmat is power!  
 
A proud, confident look, a serious attitude.  
Welcome to our city of Grozny. 
                                               




 Now, a horseman acts beautifully in life.  
You hear, this is the Caucasus, 
 Akhmat is power!243 
 
After reading the lyrics, you can notice a few instances of indexing to certain areas of 
Chechen identity. In the first couplet the most interesting word that is not always clear in 
translation is “Borz.”244 In Russian the word can mean greyhound, in which does not correlate 
the same qualities of aggressiveness nor bravery such as the Chechen translation, which means 
“wolf.” If the context is misinterpreted, you arrive to a mental visual of a Tsarist canine that is 
better at sport hunting and races than its primordial ancestor’s imagery of pack identity and 
collective nature ready to defend. This historical natural imaginary of the wolf in the forest 
reinforces the relational identity many Chechens have with the animal and the land over the 
centuries, defending his or her home territory from invaders.  
Another imaginary involving cultural lore is that of the horseman. The horsemen are the 
traditional warriors who often did nabegs(raids) and became abregs(outlaws) that would live in 
the mountains to evade capture. The horseman is a common character in the Caucasus in Russian 
literature and local culture, with many inhabitants possessing horsemanship skills. The horse 
stills exists, but more commonly by vehicles having high horse power. Ramzan Kadyrov himself 
once led one of the biggest Calvary rides in recent history with approximately 1200 men in 
traditional attire.245  
 Another cultural aspect present in the lyrics is the call out to the men from a few cities 
south of Grozny and the resort town of Veduchi, where a new ski resort was opened in 2018, 
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZC0Q4yt9Zw&feature=emb_title 
244 Taranov, Andrei. Read Theme-Based Dictionary: British English-Chechen - 3000 Words. Accessed January 28, 
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displaying the progress Chechnya has made since the end of the “Chechenisation” period.246 The 
men Timati labels as “borodachi” or “the bearded ones,” signifies to their adherence to Islam and 
to the suras of the Koran, or rather their form of Sufism that is mixed with Chechen adat. 
Regardless if a bearded male is adherent or not, this identification stretches into the religious 
realm as a rallying cry.  
 The most interesting aspect of the song arrives when Timati harmonizes “Yes, this is 
Russia, this is the city of Grozny” noting that the city is still an undeniable part of mother Russia 
and Kadyrov will welcome those who come home to make Chechnya and Russia great. This 
verses calls to the Chechen diaspora to pick up from the countries they took refuge in during the 
Chechen war years and to come back to be a part of the new Chechnya. However, this verse is 
very important to its relation to the slogan Akhmat-Sila because the slogan is also intertwined 
with the KRA factor, which can be taken as insidious. The KRA factor is often used in the 
context of disciplining dissidents such as Musa Lomaev, Chechen separatists who fled to Europe, 
and incorporating rebels who did not want to be killed, but made into a “foot soldier” of Kadyrov 
as explored in chapter one and as demonstrated in figure 4.17.  
Kadyrov’s Fight Clubs, Patronage, and Duty 
 
Now that we have explored related social media keywords of Akhmat-Sila on Chechen 
government Instagram accounts and in music, we will take a look at the slogan’s circulation, 
appearances, and significance in Kadyrov’s combat-sport organizations. These organizations are 
vital for Kadyrov because they provide an outlet to the world on Chechen prowess and bravado 
in the ring and to demonstrate Chechen warrior culture. Mac Schneider highlights this aspect, 
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noting that “Kadyrov uses social media to craft a warrior persona that is based in historical 
notions of Chechen identity.”247 Karim Zidan’s statement adds this notion of Kadyrov’s combat 
sport activities as such; “He popularized combat sports in Chechnya by elevating Chechen 
fighters to elite social status, creating structured facilities and gyms, and propagating the idea 
that proficiency in combat sports such as MMA is part of Chechen manhood.”248 This 
popularization of sport for Chechens also extends out of the region to certain members of the 
diaspora, such as the earlier example of Kadyrov’s approval of undefeated Swedish-Chechen 
UFC Middle-Heavyweight Khamzat Chimaev and his visit to the homeland in January 2021. 
Kadyrov finds every opportunity to stretch his influence farther and farther. Ultimately, 
Kadyrov’s goal stretches beyond local branding, but rather, international branding of the best 
regional fighters to join his “mixed martial arts empire that exports fighters to the UFC.”249  
Preferably, he would like these prized fighters to come out of his personal clubs. 
However, on October 6th, 2018 Kadyrov’s inspirations only grew when neighboring Dagestani 
fighter Khabib Nurmagomedov laid-out Conner McGregor at UFC 229 bring home the UFC 
belt.250 Seizing the moment, Kadyrov patronized Khabib as if he was one of his fighters, obliging  
him with a “new Mercedes and recognized him as an honorary citizen of Chechnya...” branding 
                                               
247 Schneider, Mac. Ramzan Kadyrov: Brutal Tyrant, Instagram Star. Vox, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bYic1R0i28&t=12s.  
248 Zidan, Karim. “UFC Champ Kamaru Usman Visits Chechen Dictator Ramzan Kadyrov’s MMA Fight Club.” 
Bloody Elbow, November 26, 2020. https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2020/11/26/21721674/ufc-champ-kamaru-
usman-chechen-dictator-ramzan-kadyrovs-mma-fight-club-politics. 
249 NPR. “Chechen Leader’s MMA Empire: A Tool For Propaganda And More.” NPR.org, July 31, 2017. 
https://www.npr.org/2017/07/31/540652582/chechen-leaders-mma-empire-a-tool-for-propaganda-and-more. 





Khabib worthy of the Chechen title and sending a message to those who do not know his 
patronage yet that material wealth and social status comes with octagon or ring domination.251  
Although Kadyrov’s fight clubs has been known locally for a few years now and slowly 
internationally, the U.S. Government did not take notice of his emerging sports network until a 
little later, after realizing Instagram was not his only influential method. In consequence, the 
U.S. Treasury Department imposed stricter sanctions, to include sanctions on all of Kadyrov’s 
sport enterprises. The US Treasury Department even went as far to restrict his notorious slogan 
in any UFC sanctioned ring with sport journalist Alexander Kruglov stating, “the fighters will 
not be able to shout the chant “Akhmat Sila”, they will not come out to the song “You represent 
the legendary club Akhmat,”252 known to all fighting fans, and somehow associate themselves 
with the club.”253  
Here, the significance of Akhmat-Sila is branded as a slogan that many fighters, fans, and 
hopefuls culturally identify with and its significance of progress, reaching octagons far from 
home on a new level never reached before, only to be denied the cry that encapsulates all that 
collective memory of hardship and struggles of the past 20 years. The U.S Treasury 
Department’s late realization of Kadyrov’s sports influence showed that they had underestimated 
his combat-sport activities beforehand. The slogan’s proliferation caused the department to 
notice that they were not exactly being effective against Kadyrov by only closing his Instagram 
                                               
251 Zucker, Joseph. “UFC’s Khabib Nurmagomedov Poses for Picture with Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov.” 
Bleacher Report, February 4, 2019. https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2819319-ufcs-khabib-nurmagomedov-poses-
for-picture-with-chechen-leader-ramzan-kadyrov. 
252  In the original Russian: “..бойцы не смогут кричать коронное «Ахмат сила», не будут выходить под 
известную всем фанатам боёв песню «Ты представляешь легендарный клуб Ахмат» и как-либо ещё 
ассоциировать себя с клубом.” 
        253 Kruglov, Alexander. “«Ахмат» — Не Сила: Как Санкции Против Кадырова Ударят По ММА в России.” 






or sanctioning his family, which is more of a personal jab. But, the department decided that by 
limiting Kadyrov’s ability to compete in US based international fight organizations, which 
strikes Akhmat-Sila’s credibility by limiting his fighters’ prospects, was a more effective route to 
take. 
From a small start with just the MMA Akhmat Fight Club in 2014/2015, Kadyrov’s 
fighting organizations have expanded to various areas of the culture, with one club serving 
boxers, the other MMA, and then a whole fight organization that was supposed to rival the UFC 
at some point in the future the ACA, among others growing for other disciplines. Within these 
combat-sport organizations Zidan also points out that many “Fighters who are signed to the fight 
club’s official roster are paid monthly stipends that cover medical expenses, training costs, and 
travel fees. Depending on the level of success achieved, fighters are also gifted with expensive 
cars and other ostentatious goods.”254 While sanctions are still in effect, Kadyrov’s aspirations 
will be hampered down, leaving many fighters needing to make a choice on how to go forward 
with their fighting careers, even with a generous patronage. If they decide to go with Akhmat 
Fight Clubs, they will receive immediate status and have a tangible way to see their material 
wealth expand in the confines of Chechnya and the greater Post-Soviet space. Or, the upcoming 
fighters can try to go toward the UFC and have to find gyms that are willing to train and sponsor 
them, many of which are out of the region and sometimes out of the country. Another avenue is 
to stay with the club and serve with one of the armed forces partnered with the fight clubs. Some 
fight and then serve Kadyrov by arming up. Here are a few of the clubs that Kadyrov operates 
and related content but not limited to: 
                                               
254 Zidan, Karim. “UFC Champ Kamaru Usman Visits Chechen Dictator Ramzan Kadyrov’s MMA Fight Club.” 







Official account for the boxing club. Source: https://www.instagram.com/akhmat_boxing/  
 
Akhmat Boxing is very popular with the patronized class of fighters. A few profiles show 
and give thanks to the gifts and opportunities that Kadyrov has bestowed upon them. Some 
people show their devotion not only fighting competitively for Kadyrov, but also serving in the 
administration. A few visual examples are provided below:  
Figure 4.24 
 
Akhmat Boxing Head Valid Edilov, UFC Fighter Abdul-Kerim’s brother, helps friend Rustam after an 
intense gym session in an Instagram montage. The background music is again Timati’s “Grozny.” At the 
end of the Instagram montage in tandem they chant “Akhmat-Sila!!” Brotherly call? October 16th, 2019. 




A recirculated photo on Edilov’s team mate’s profile. Patronage for the boys with Akhmat-Sila apparel and 








Akhmat Boxer Hussein Musalipov won, one of Valid Edilov’s friends. Source: 
https://www.instagram.com/p/CEsGQQpnesn/  
 
In figure 4.25, you can notice the gifts and cars being gifted. However, what is not 
apparent is the money reward without reading the post. The translation of what was possible to 
capture in the screenshot goes to this tune of, “….step by step participation  in the life of club 
Akhmat and its pupils. By the end of the meeting from the Kadyrov fund (Chechen) all the 
boxers were handed over gifts and monetary rewards. Our success, your merit/service, Ramzan 
Akhmatovich! (Chechen) Akhmat-Sila!”255 The part “Our Success, your merit” strikes at the 
heart of what many of the young fighters believe happens in their relationship to Kadyrov and 
what Akhmat-Sila means.256 Not only did Musalipov encapsulate what he said with the slogan, 
but gives the idea that there is a connection to competitive fighting, patronage, and to a 
community. Figure 4.25 demonstrates these three factors with a group of competitive fighters all 
being gifted expensive gifts, with one gifted a Mercedes Benz, all part of Kadyrov’s patronage 
for successful Chechens.  
 
 
                                               
255 Musalipov_95. “001 (@musalipov__95) • Instagram Photos and Videos.” Social Media. Instagram. Accessed 
March 31, 2021. https://www.instagram.com/p/B9XW9bcnWD9/.  
256 Musalipov_95. “001 (@musalipov__95) • Instagram Photos and Videos.” Social Media. Instagram. Accessed 






September 29th, 2020. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CFuUm0AnK8w/  
 
In figure 4.27, Rustam, a friend of Edilov’s, decides to demonstrate to his Russian 
followers what Akhmat-Sila means to him. Rustam then goes on to lift a small front-wheel drive 
car. This demonstration of the slogan performs to an audience, which in this case, are other 
Russian citizens in far off areas. In addition, in the text part of the post, Rustam reaffirms that 
“The slogan "Akhmat-Power" means adherence to the principles and ideology of the path 
indicated by the First President of the Chechen Republic Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov. That is, we 
mean the path of Akhmat-Hadji and those who follow this path.”257 Rustam points out further 
that not all follow this path, but those who do are for Chechnya’s progress: 
Today schools, streets, avenues, parks, squares and squares are named after him. The 
Order named after Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov is awarded to the best people of our republic, 
the Russian Federation. His good deeds will always live in our hearts, a picture that is an 
example for us. The achievements that we have today in the republic under the leadership 
of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov @ ya_pomoshnik_kra_95 are a 
worthy continuation of the path of Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov, aimed at the development of 
the Chechen Republic and a tribute to the memory of the First President Akhmat-Hadji 
Kadyrov.258 
                                               
        257 Ocherkhadzhiev, Rustam. “@rustamocher.” Social Media. Instagram. Accessed November 17, 2020. 
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Rustam’s statements show that this path is more than a religious way of being, but the deeds and 
actions to develop Chechnya into something great. He does not see the slogan’s proliferation as 
an ominous branding, but a memorialization of a worthy human being. Rustam also confers that 
this path is a part of Akhmat-Sila, linking the meaning of development, progress, and good will 
to it.  
Figure 4.28 
 
Edilov was gifted a Mercedes Benz on his birthday for yours truly, Ramzan Kadyrov.  June 8th, 2019.  
Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/BydoCVAg9LG/  
 
The patronage also extends to members and directors of the club for birthdays. Another 
theme that seems to be prevalent in Chechen Social Media is the salutation to birthdays of people 
who serve under Kadyrov, whether competitively or within one of his organizations. Edilov, who 
manages one of Kadyrov’s organizations, gives thanks to Kadyrov for all that he has at the end 
of the post, where Edilov states “…his participation in my life, his life wisdom, and advice have 





been for me a big benefit from the Almighty.” 259This sentence gives the indication that 
Kadyrov’s appearance in his life has been so great that it must have been a benefit or gift from 
God himself. Many consider Kadyrov their benefactor, reaching heights they could have never 
dreamed of without his patronage. Not only do these actions reaffirm loyalty from a part of the 
young population, but they demonstrate to others what can be gained with Kadyrov’s financial 
support.  
Shamil Hataev: Akhmat Fight Club Boxer 
 
Figure 4.29   
 
 
Source: https://www.instagram.com/khataev_voin_shamil/  
 
                                               





Above in the figure 4.29, is Shamil Hataev, one of Akhmat Boxing Club’s prized 
fighters.260 After surfing through the Instagram account, many facets of what Akhmat-Sila means 
can be found throughout the later part of his profile as the slogan popularized. You can see that 
not only is he in good spirits with Kadyrov, but he is advertised on the back of car windows with 
Akhmat-Sila placed under their images. When Hataev is not fighting, he serves with the Chechen 
RosGvardia, easily mistaken for Kadyrovtsy when in the black uniform. Usually the Kadyrovtsy 
will have their name tapes signifying their regiment. Meanwhile, with RosGvardia there are no 
patches on the black uniform while it is visible in the green uniform. Is it possible to be in both 
groups? Or do the uniforms note the type of duty for the shift? Hataev is also graciously 
patronized with nice cars, which in one photo he stands with a Mercedes-Benz AMG G 63 SUV, 
MSRP on the manufacture’s website at a hefty $156,450.261 
Figure 4.30 
 
The original club. Primarily MMA centered, including training clubs across Central Asia. 




ACA Belts in all their lavish glory, similar to the UFC Championship belts. Source: 
www.instagram.com/akhmat_mma/  
                                               
260 Khataev_voin_shamil. Social media. Instagram. Accessed February 12, 2021. 
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In figures 4.30 and 4.31, the Akhmat MMA Instagram account is a promotional platform 
for events, more birthday congratulations, and Patriot and Kadyrov supporting their fighters with 
training visits. There are a few notable fighters on the club’s page, but overall the page promotes 
new competitors and amateur to intermediate fighters. Branding is everywhere. This page is male 
dominate and does not show the female members who belong to the club. However, I will 
highlight one member of the club that has made it to the UFC and is not a male nor is a native of 
Chechnya, but is still from the Caucasus region. 





Source for all photos in this grouping: www.instagram.com/likajojua/  
 
Liana Jojua, Georgian by nationality and Russian/Chechen-affiliated by fight 




March 2019. 262 Before making her UFC debut, Jojua was primarily sponsored by Akhmat Fight 
Clubs, often seen hanging out with the head of all training, Vismuradov (Patriot).  Jojua initially 
signed with Akhmat Fight Clubs because others did not give her a chance. Jojua relays this  
gratefulness in her post with Vismuradov, exclaiming, “Abuzaid Djandarovich believed in me 
when the majority thought I wouldn’t have a chance. Thanks a lot to you. I hope I justified your 
page. Akhmat-Sila!”263  This is the first time a woman uses Akhmat-Sila in this research, using it 
in a positive sentiment of financial or organizational mobility. Jojua also wears the apparel at all 
Akhmat Fight Club organization fights and often trains in the labeled apparel.264 However, this 
started to change. When the December 2020 U.S. sanctions came, I noticed on her profile that 
Jojua started to train more often in Istanbul, Turkey and now, in the United States. Although she 
still gives thanks and is very friendly with her Akhmat Fight Club benefactors, it seems she is 
keeping her associations at arm’s length to wait out and see how the UFC organization will 
handle the current predicament with the new sanctions.  
 This impediment circles back to Kruglov’s article speaking about fighters who have 
contracts with Kadyrov’s organization might not be able to obtain a visa to enter the United 
States now or at a later date. Would this affect Jojua entering the U.S. if she came to search for a 
new training gym? Would this cause problems if she was invited to a U.S. competition but 
                                               
262 Translation of original post Top-Left Photo: “Fighter of Akhmat Fight Club Liana Jojua signs contract with the 
UFC. Date of debut and name of first rival in the American promotion will be revealed in the near future. Liana will 
perform in the 61.2 kilo weight. Remember, her record sits at 7 wins and 2 losses.” March 13th, 2019.  
Source: www.instagram.com/za.vismuradov_95/  
        263 Likajojua. “Liana Jojua (@likajojua) • Instagram Photos and Videos.” Social Media. Instagram, February 24, 
2018. https://www.instagram.com/p/Bfkxo0ZFR-F/  
264 Translation of original post Top-Left Photo: “Fighter of Akhmat Fight Club Liana Jojua signs contract with the 
UFC. Date of debut and name of first rival in the American promotion will be revealed in the near future. Liana will 
perform in the 61.2 kilo weight. Remember, her record sits at 7 wins and 2 losses.” March 13th, 2019.  





politically could not participate? I do not know Jojua’s status with entry into the United States, 
but what is known is that she is currently in New York state training: 
Figure 4.33 
 
Translation: “Surprise! I am in New York, and already in Training (reluctant emoji).” February 2021. 
Source:  https://www.instagram.com/p/CK7AYt5lhGK/  
 
Visibly in figure 4.33, Jojua is actively training in the USA and has a training network to 
support extended periods. This photo relays that Jojua was able to enter the United States, 
regardless if her visa was old and still had time left on it or newly acquired after sanctions were 
already in place. Also, no Akhmat-Sila apparel was worn and there was no relevant indexing of 
Chechnya nor its leader. Vismuradov has put a like on her photo, unsure if there are any 
undertones underlying the action. Currently, Jojua has been in the United States now for seven 
weeks, and she has worn Akhmat-Sila apparel from time to time as the controversy settles. As of 
April 2021, Jojua is training at the main UFC Performance Center in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
In addition to the organizations already mentioned, below are some of Kadyrov’s other 
fight organizations. Although worth a mention to show that they exist, these screen shots are 




Figure 4.34 shows Kadyrov’s international fight organization that is supposed to one day rival 
the UFC. Figure 4.35 shows the less-popular but growing style of sport in Chechnya, kickboxing. 
Kadyrov made sure to leave no style unturned where he could dominate in the ring and 
demonstrate Chechnya’s warrior image. Figure 4.37 shows Kadyrov’s sport involvement outside 
of the ring, to include a bike club named after his father. 
Figure 4.34 
 
Absolute Championship Akhmat. Kadyrov’s version of UFC. From the summary alone you can see it is a 





One club I did not expect Kadyrov to have. Going through the page, you see Kadyrov giving praise to 
fighters, advertising fights, and montages and photos of training, many in which chant Akhmat-Sila, have it 











December 29th, 2020. Source: www.instagram.com/kadyrov_95sport/  
 
One area where we can see the embedded and intertextual nature of Akhmat-Sila is in 
this screenshot of Kadyrov on a bicycle. In the hashtag section you can see a wide array of tags 
that can be encompassed by the slogan.265 The hashtags include but are not limited to: #Kadyrov, 
#Chechnya, #development, #sport, #Putin, #Russia, #Leader, #Safety, #Grozny, #Unity, 
#Akhmatsila, #95region, #centeroftheworld, #politics, #ReligionIslam, #Culture, #Traditions, 
#KRA, #Peace, #Chechens, #Nation, and #Family.266 This set of data can encapsulate what the 
slogan signifies. You can see a Pro-Russian narrative (#Putin, #Russia, #Leader, #Safety) 
alongside a positive Chechen grouping (#Kadyrov, #Chechnya, #Development, #Sport) with 
Kadyrov particular hashtags indexing to aspects of his regime (#Akhmatsila, #95region, 
#centeroftheworld, #Politic, #ReligionIslam, #culture, #Traditions, #KRA, #Peace, #Chechens). 
                                               
265 Kadyrov_95sport. “@kadyrov_95sport Instagram Profile • 77 Photos and Videos.” Social Media. Instagram, 
December 29, 2020. https://www.instagram.com/kadyrov_95sport/.  
266Original Russian: #Кадыров, #Чечня, #Развитие, #Спорт, #Путин, #Россия, #Лидер, #Безопасность, 
#Грозный, #Единство, #АхматСила, #95регион, #Центрмира, #Политика, #РелигияИслам, #Культура, 




These hashtags grouped above weave different aspects of the slogan’s force. The Pro-
Russian hashtags signifies Kadyrov’s loyalty to President Putin, highlighting that their specific 
relationship brings leadership and security for both parties. Putin maintains regional security and 
territorial integrity, while Kadyrov maintains his complete control with unlimited state funds. 
The Chechen hashtag group indexes to followers that Chechnya revolves around Ramzan 
Kadyrov, development, and sport. Any clicks on these specific hashtags will bring you to 
positive Chechen spheres where Kadyrov is depicted as the benevolent leader of his people, 
investing in development projects, and elevating the region’s youth through sport through 
patronage, keeping them away from foreign influences.  
The last grouping of hashtags is the most interesting, developing a Kadyrov centric 
national branding narrative. Not only are the majority of the hashtags Chechen specific 
(#akhmatsila #95region, #KRA, #Chechens), but offer  an internal view on how Kadyrov sees 
Chechnya (#centeroftheworld, politics, #ReligionIslam, #Culture, #Traditions, #Peace, #Nation, 
and #Family). Here we can see Akhmat-Sila’s significance as a reinforcement of legitimate 
power paired with Kadyrov’s KRA factor (#KRA), its connections with the region (#95region, 
#Chechens), and his intertwining of  the slogan with these other hashtags, making these factors 
inseparable. Kadyrov’s slogan explicates his world view on where he wants Chechnya to rise and 
ultimately be recognized for internationally for: Chechen superior morals, socio-religious 
adherence, and political importance. 
  In addition to the textual signs, Kadyrov embodies many of these hashtags by his 
performative action in figure 4.37. Kadyrov not only performs sport by riding a bicycle, but 
displays his locally known semiotic devices on commodity. Kadyrov’s shirt on the top left corner 




signifying the Chechen regional license plate code. Third, Kadyrov pays homage to his father, 
with his first name Akhmat printed above the 95. In a sense, Kadyrov is living what Akhmat-Sila 
is to him: healthy living, family memorialization, aware of his piousness, giving thanks to 
Russia, and branding his region in a positive light.  
Akhmat-Sila on Infrastructure 
 
During this research, Akhmat-Sila was found in its usual poly-contextual forms online on 
various websites, social media, and on clothing, but the slogan has also been gaining ground with 
its appearance on infrastructure. Over the last 20 years from the Chechenisation period of the 2nd 
Chechen War to the present day, Chechnya has been in a constant state of development and 
repair, despite certain areas still holding on to the essence of another era. On the contrary to the 
smaller villages, Grozny and a few other notable cities in the region have been modernizing and 
developing to a point of acceptable beautification regardless of the cult-like naming of 
everything after the elder Kadyrov. With state funds and full control to dictate how to design any 
building in the region, sometimes known by its foundation name, the Kadyrov Fund,267 Ramzan 
Kadyrov has taken some initiative to use these affordances that are unique to him to give a 
personal touch to certain edifices and to create landmarks for the Chechen collective memory of 
his rule.  
 Memorialization seems to be a major factor in the Akhmat-Sila slogan, given that when 
chanted, provides a precise index to a historical period of Chechnya, signals to a certain area of 
the Chechen population, and normalizes the slogan along religious lines, often paired with the 
Islamic chant Allahu-Akbar giving thanks to God, thus sanctifying it. If there is one thing we can 
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take from structures, is that often but not always, people do not destroy them, even if what is 
depicted on there is undesirable. Using the soviet example, you cannot just take all the signs of 
another era completely away. Something will always remain. Kadyrov must have looked at the 
ancient watch towers in Chechnya and thought to himself that if he can literally cement the 
slogan in concrete, that even after he is out of power peacefully, or disposed of, that the slogan 
with endure eternally. 
 One of the most recent “akhmatized” structures has been the arches to enter the city of 
Grozny on the Argun side in figure 4.38. Before, the old arches were decrepit and did not have 
much on it other than the old welcome and thank you for visiting signage on it. Now, we will 
take a look on how this multi-month long project came to be when it was completed:  
Figure 4.38 
 
After looking at the hashtags and the gear on top of the vehicle, it seems to be an MVD unit. January 11th, 
2021.  
 
On October 5th, 2020, the new arches were completed and given a ceremony. This 
Instagram screenshot, taken January 11th, 2021, shows how one security official feels about the 
new arches. The main account’s comment explicates keywords to Akhmat-Sila with hashtags to 




#Bmw) Chechens (#grozny, #groznycity, #chechens, #ChechensinMoscow #Chechnya) and 
security organs (#MVD, #GYVDD, #PDD, #procuratura).268 These hashtags catapult this image 
of Akhmat-Sila to audiences across Russia and the globe, with specification to the Russian 
security organs and Chechens. The posted comments, identified as Chechen followers through 
the MVD shield with Chechen flag colors on the first(@alikhadievvv), an Islamic inscription on 
the second(a.r.s.48), and by Chechen language phrase on the third(mtmt1018), are supportive of 
the arch and its inscription. The first two supports signify approval with a thumbs-up emoji and 
the second comment includes a flexing arm for strength.  
However, one regional opposition news source, Caucasian Knot, found less than 
congratulatory remarks for the arch and its slogan that takes place for a welcome on social media 
outlets and interviews. Memorial board member Oleg Orlov says the motto, "Akhmat is power" 
promotes on branding Akhmad-Hadji’s cult of personality and “path” without elaborating on any 
meaningful achievements.269 Assassination survivor Chechen Blogger Tumso Abdurakhmanov 
states that the slogan "… is the cultivation, but not so much of the personality of Akhmat 
Kadyrov, as of the regime itself, the authorities. The cry “Akhmat is power” has long been about 
not only and not so much about the wrestling club.”270 In addition, public relations director 
Andrey Kozlov delves into Akhmat-Sila, highlighting, “The brand is not based on the policy 
pursued by Kadyrov Sr. It is an appeal to young people who personify or should personify 
modern Chechnya, to young people who go in for sports. (This motto) is already part of the 
popular (culture) of the Chechen people: people [sic]they write "Akhmat is power" on their cars, 
                                               
268 Original Russian hashtags: (#аxматсила, #кадыров, #кадыроврамзан), (#мерседес, #бмв), (#грозный, 
#грозныйсити, #чеченцы, #чеченцывмоскве #чечня), and (#мвд, #гувдд, #пдд, #прокуратура). 
269 Krasnov, Oleg. “Кавказский Узел | Власти Чечни Выхолостили Образ Ахмата Кадырова Формальным 
Поклонением.” Caucasian Knot, October 10, 2020. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/355145/. 




T-shirts, phone cases, that is, on everyday objects.”271 These sentiments shows that Kadyrov is 
personal branding the region. The slogan Akhmat-Sila invites different interpretations, with 
some interviewees seeing the slogan as a way to cultivate Ramzan Kadyrov’s father’s memory, 
actions, and greatness of the regime, while others see it as nothing to do with Akhmad-Hadji’s 
vision for Chechnya, but Ramzan’s.  
Figure 4.39 
 
October 14th, 2020. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CIFeGkhoNCR/  
 
Above in figure 4.39 is the entrance to Grozny airport. This entrance signage now was 
not always so, as demonstrated on a Moscow photographer’s blog on his return to Chechnya 25 
years later after his last visit to the region.272 Alexander Nemenov’s blog is also a great source of 
before and after photos of Chechen infrastructure in general, showing the destruction of the 
Chechen Wars along with anecdotes and then, photos from his 2019 visit including an airport 
entrance photo, showing that the slogan was non-existent before. Both figures 4.38 and 4.39 
above show something about Akhmat-Sila that is truly outstanding. Not in the artistic sense, but, 
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that something that started as a simple fight club chant evolved into something much bigger than 
what anyone could have imagined. The edified locations of the slogan in these examples are also 
positioned in frequented areas, letting visitors know who travel into Grozny the slogan before 
they can even fathom what it could truly mean. Below are a few more figures included to show 
range of the slogan on infrastructure but not limited to:  
Figure 4.40 
 
Source: www.instagram.com/kadyrov_news95/  
 
Figure 4.40 demonstrates the slogan’s planning on infrastructure through a digital 
visualization of a future project.273 This particular screenshot shows the slogan’s construction in 
architectural efforts for further branding. This building will be a sports-health center, in line with 
Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen identity formation along his lines of fitness and a sound mind. The 
balloons symbolize the partnership that Russia and Chechnya hold, with the Russian colors on 
the left and the Chechen colors on the right.  
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October 5th, 2020. Source: Grozny.TV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LcB18EOlwZQ&list=PLLsEU-
xtGimLjLMjsZrJZsNZ2inVI3hqx&index=31 
 
In figure 4.41 is a newly opened SOBR Terek Specialized Education Training Center, 
with the center’s battalion patch with a letter “K” for Kadyrov in the middle and the slogan 
Akhmat-Sila etched into the grate iron of the gate.274 Not only is the training center placed in 
Akhmat-Yurt, previously called Tsentaroi and the birthplace of Ramzan Kadyrov, shows at 0:22 
in the video a picture of Akhmad-Hadji to the left and Ramzan on the right, united by the Islamic 
star with the inscription “God” in Arabic at the top, forming into triangle at the internal entrance.   
 Another observation in the videos shows a difference between old Chechnya and new 
Chechnya. MVD Chief Ruslan Alkhanov gave a speech and ended it with only “Allahu-Akbar,” 
the traditional ending salutation historically accepted among pious Chechens. Then, at minute 
2:12 SOBR Terek Commander Abuzaid Vismuradov concludes his speech with “Allahu-Akbar, 
Akhmat-Sila, Allahu-Akbar.” Not only did Vismuradov add the slogan, but with an additional 
salutation to God. Afterward, one of Kadyrov’s relations, SOBR Terek training center 
commander Abdul-Kerim Kadyrov concludes his speech with Akhmat-Sila and them prompts 
his trainees to chat it immediately after, then followed with a similar action for Allahu-Akbar. 
This dichotomy of verbal demonstrations show a separation of Chechen ideals, one that possibly 
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aligns with a more traditionalist pious view of Chechnya, while the other walks the newly 
formed line, giving Akhmad-Hadji’s elevation to holiness next to God and show of loyalty to 
Kadyrov as a right-hand man or a family member. 
Figure 4.42 
 
February 22th, 2021. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CLmdARjoabP/  
 
The trend we can see of Akhmat-Sila on infrastructure is that the slogan is being 
memorialized on everyday buildings used by all facets of society. Not a building will be left 
untouched at this rate. We have already seen the slogan on clothing apparel, chanted, textualized, 
hash-tagged, digitalized, and now on new or revitalized infrastructure. The slogan almost also 
acts as a watermark on all completed projects to show authorship, in case the name of the author 
or its encapsulating word pairing slips someone’s mind, can be easily retrieved.  
  Here, what is important is that the slogan is being recognized internationally and not just 
within Chechnya as a signifier of the Chechen nation. The final and most recent aspect of 
Akhmat-Sila on infrastructure comes in a holographic form. On February 22nd, 2021 in Dubai, 
UAE, Kadyrov and his entourage visited the city-state on a business-relations trip and a 




world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa, during dinner.275 In figure 4.42 you can see the 
immensity of the holographic image, taking up the entire physical space of the building. This 
saturation of the building’s physical space with the holographic likeness of Akhmad-Hadji’s 
image acts as a predictor of the slogan’s proliferation, now apparent on the World’s tallest 
building at one of the Islamic World’s economic centers. In the comments section you can see 
the Chechen RosGvardia giving their support, stating, “A little region in which knows the whole 
world thanking Ramzan Akhmatovich Kadyrov! Masha Allah! [Chechen] Akhmat-Sila Allahu-
Akbar!”276 Not only is this post proliferating at this moment, but members are all making sure to 
add their homages to a historic moment for Chechnya, with one of its martyrs being displayed on 
the world stage.  
One Example in figure 4.43, the Kadyrovtsy Commander Zamid Chelaev made sure to 
give his thoughts on what this event meant:  
                 Figure 4.43 
 
                        Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CLmdARjoabP/  
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Chelaev adds, “ Today we see, that the path of Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov [Chechen] is true 
and eternal. Respect to our people appears in many countries of the world. Masha Allah. We are 
on the path of the great son of the Chechen people, of the first President of the Chechen 
Republic, Hero of Russia, Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov [Chechen] Akhmat-Sila-Allahu-Akbar.”277 
This thought is only one of many that can be collectivized by Kadyrov’s entourage and fellow 
officials in the comment section, but currently hard to follow due to the massive amount of 
comments being added. We can see through infrastructure, Ramzan Kadyrov has successfully 
spread the slogan Akhmat-Sila not only on local buildings and monuments, but on an 
internationally recognized building as a holographic mobile image in a highly visited locality, 
Dubai. This path that Chelaev speaks of, although unclear at the beginning, seems to be the path 
to world recognition. Now, we will move on to the slogan’s proliferation locally within 
Kadyrov’s armed forces.  
Akhmat-Sila in Chechen Armed Forces 
 
As we identified earlier in this research, many Instagram pages of the local armed forces 
are public and show unobliging support for Kadyrov’s government and provide legitimate armed 
support to the slogan Akhmat-Sila. Almost every page signals this support with a handful of 
keywords in their posts or profile names and homage to Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov on the profile 
summary at the top of the Instagram account. Along with these organization accounts, Kadyrov’s 
entourage often follows suit and re-circulates many supporting posts and offer birthday 
salutations. Now, we will look at some of the armed forces and see a few photos of them in 
action and or giving homage to Akhmat-Sila or Akhmat-Hadji that was not shown before:  
 
                                               






Above is a YouTube video showing a training montage for the Chechen SOBR Terek Group. The captions 




From the same video a minute further we see a COBR Terek training group holding up the flag of Ramzan 
Kadyrov with Chechen colors behind him. Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBED4Fo5LQo  
 
The patch worn by Kadyrovtsy. Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBED4Fo5LQo  
 
 
Translation: “ Akhmat Sila Allahu-Akbar only forward we are not afraid of no one us Muslims, Khabib 




In this video in figure 4.44 and the following two screenshots you can see how the slogan 
is defined again along with the signs indexical of loyalty to Kadyrov and community of armed 
force groups. In addition to the mentioned factors, content creator Oxide goes into detail of 
SOBR Terek and its main differences with other SOBR units across the country, with the 
differences lying in the command, force size, gear, culture and specializations that the officers 
train in. One main difference is budget for gear. If not familiar with battle kit, much of the SOBR 
groups outside Chechnya are usually seen wearing the typical bulky Soviet-style gear while the 
special Terek unit is equipped with modern western-style sleek in appearance special operations 
gear. As for comments, a notable one was the last screenshot under figure 4.44.  
This comment shows support for the Terek unit and connects the brotherhood through the 
Islamic religion, MMA warrior culture, and geographical sign linkage with the eagle, the natural 
imaginary of neighboring Dagestan. Below is another form of natural imagery:  
Figure 4.45 
 
Source: https://www.instagram.com/chechen_warriors95/  
 
Linking the imagined Chechen warrior to the wolf, the Chechen Warriors page helps as a 
promotional and directory platform for all happenings within the local Chechen armed forces 
community.278 From video montages from the field, training events, to special preparation 
                                               
278 This page often has its own content of all the various armed forces in Chechnya and also re-circulates many of 
the shared posted that are seen in other Chechen government or affiliated. If you cannot find a specific unit’s 




announcements, you can find a lot for support for Akhmat-Sila, often ending their postings and 
or video montages with the chant.279 Many of the follower accounts at the bottom of the 
screenshots are by Chechen leadership and armed forces members who legitimize this page. The 
page also supplies a hyperlink to its Facebook page, which is quite surprising given that most of 
the circulating accounts other than Instagram are VK or Telegram. 
Figure 4.46 
 
February 1st, 2021. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CKvpQ5jqgxA/  
 
Figure 4.46 shows a typical post on the Chechen Warriors page, highlighting the 
specialness of their local forces and action as the forward operation force for national security.280 
Due to the constraints of the Instagram interface, it is impossible to display the whole comment 
and following hashtags. Luckily, I can list what is found at the bottom part of the post comment: 
#нохчо, #нохчи, #нохчалла, #чеченец, #чеченцы, #чечня, #грозный, #аргун, #г1алг1ай, 
#г1алг1и, #ингуш, #ингуши, #ингушетия, #магас, #назрань, #к1онах, #к1онхи, #вайнах, 
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#брат, #борз, #берзлой, #волк, #инстаграм, and #berzloy.281 Some hashtags coincide with 
hashtags found in the arch screenshot with Chechen translations of the Russian (#нохчо, 
#нохчи, #нохчалла). In addition to this post, there are hashtags indexing to a greater Chechnya, 
including the Chechen ethnic sibling the Ingush (#ингуш, #ингуши, #ингушетия, #магас, 
#назрань). Together, Chechens and Ingush fall under the term Vainakh, also seen as brothers 
linked to the wolf imaginary(#вайнах, #брат, #борз). Akhmat-Sila in this post is not only 
indexical to Chechens, but also to their closest neighbors, the Ingush.  
Figure 4.47 
 
OMON lifting car.282 January 19th, 2021. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CKPGtl1qrGh/  
 
In figure 4.47, we have another physical representation of Akhmat-Sila lifting a vehicle, 
as Rustam(@rustamocher) demonstrated in the patronage section. This time an OMON member 
demonstrates what Akhmat-Sila means as a foot solider of Ramzan Kadyrov. He succeeds in 
lifting the vehicle, showing that the followers of Akhmat-Sila include a physical strength 
component to the slogan’s significance.  
 
                                               
281 The following terms, please copy and paste into Yandex Translate for meaning. Some of the terms are Chechen 
and cannot be found in the one Chechen dictionary I have. The words that could be translated would lose its 
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As women are not left out of MMA, they are not left out of learning special tactics with small and medium 
sized arms. However, here in this screenshot is Ramzan’s youngest adult daughter training with 
@anna_yants. December 27th, 2020. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CJT20-eKbwK/  
 
One interesting find on the Chechen warriors page is Kadyrov’s youngest adult daughter 
shooting at the range. In figure 4.48 she trains with the Kazakhstani Anna Yants, a Russian 
Spetznaz marksman instructor. Akhmat-Sila not only means Chechen men must be well-versed 
in weapons, but Chechen women can be too, if they stick to customs. A few of the customs seen 
here is that of only female company and Kadyrov’s daughter’s compliance with wearing the 
hijab. Aside from this main difference, she runs the shooting course with relative skill, with the 
page likening her to an experienced warrior.  
Figure 4.49 
 
On the page after some digging around I realized I found another special forces battalion that I did not 
know about previously. This unit in the video link in the next screen shot seem to specialize in road 









The commander of СБОН. Here he is pictured with a Carhartt sporting Kadyrov.  
Source: https://www.instagram.com/usman_edilgir/  
 
Above in figure 4.50, we can see Usman Edilgir. Unsure of any familial connections with 
Kadyrov, he is the head of the СБОН battalion depicted in figure 4.49. In his profile you can see 
various occurrences seen in many other similar profiles; pictures with Ramzan Kadyrov, wearing 
Akhmat-Sila apparel, birthday salutations, pictures with heads of other legitimate armed groups 
in the regions such as SOBR Vismuradov and Kadyrovtsy Chalaev, and congratulations to 
Kadyrov’s family members and holidays.  
Figure 4.51 
 
SBON Officer on duty.283 November 24th, 2020. Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CH-4yUpqGaq/  
 
From what we can see from the Chechen armed forces, we can notice all of them utilize 
the slogan as a signifier and a way to show support to the Kadyrov government and leadership as 
is apparent at the end of the comment in figure 4.51. Although there are many battalions, 
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events. The formidable battalion in the defense of the Chechen Republic is always in the ranks. Respect and thanks! 





regiments, and special units, they all show comradery to each other and possibly socialize 
together on and off duty. Some groups tend to be more prominent and have deeper roots  in 
Chechnya, while some groups such as СБОН, are relatively new and have a much smaller 
follower base on Instagram. They are all armed and the most specialized units seem to be the 
























After reviewing all pertinent data, I can say Chechen identity historically revolves around 
a traditional identity that evolves with time around warrior culture, Chechen adat, and religion to 
include certain aspects of the traditional meaning mutating to Kadyrov’s formulation. In 
addition, Chechen warrior culture has consistently tied itself to a strongman-like figure that 
usually held a larger than life personality and great leadership skills. During the Chechen Wars 
and Chechenisation period, this cult of personality leadership switched hands quickly due to the 
volatility of such positions during these times. However, only one Chechen leader out of a 
handful to exist during this period was immortalized.  
This immortalized man was Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov. All the other leaders such as 
Dudayev, Basayev, and Maskhadov can only be found in niche history books, no statues, and 
definitely not presented in a good light in today’s Chechnya. The Mufti on the other hand, was 
sanctified as a martyr for not only Chechnya, but for the Russian Federation. Akhmad-Hadji’s 
son Ramzan Kadyrov immortalized him not only by putting his face everywhere, but wrapped 
into a slogan, Akhmat-Sila. The main difference for Akhmat-Hadji’s mythical elevation was that 
he sided with Putin’s Government for autonomy and financial security in return for Russia’s 
physical security in the region. Due to this connection, in 2004, Ramzan Kadyrov was able to 
take the helm of the insurgency operations with Putin’s blessing; this set of factors brought in the 
new era for Chechen identity and memory formation. Ramzan Kadyrov’s 14 years as head of the 
Chechen Republic has not only eradicated nearly all insurgents by killing them or absorbing 
them into his personal forces, but has brought upon complete change to Chechnya.  
Some but not of these changes include: infrastructure redevelopment, social mobility for 




extends into international sport competitions for the gifted, clothing apparel, super signage of 
Kadyrov’s father Akhmat-Hadji attached to every building entrance, but has developed a slogan 
that can wrap all these aspects of his rule into one, Akhmat-Sila. 
Scholars of Ramzan Kadyrov’s social media use have often focused on his personal use 
of Instagram before his December 2017 account closure due to US sanctions for human rights 
abuses related to the LGBT purges. All unfavorable aspects aside, Kadyrov sought to rebrand 
Chechnya in a new light: as the land that produced world class fighters in all domains, as the 
most pious region of Russia, and as the most developing and beautifying region to date. These 
scholars that study Kadyrov’s Instagram consistently identified certain factors in all his postings 
to the social media platform revolving around heteronormative and cultural lines. However, 
within the quantitative and qualitative analyses of Kadyrov’s original profile, there was a gap in 
the study of Kadyrov’s proliferating slogan that required a more in-depth exploration of the 
Chechen social media sphere. This research not only attempts to explore all the various signs 
used in Chechen social media, but seeks to understand the all-encompassing slogan that is 
proliferating across the digital sphere, material culture, and warrior culture in Chechen society.  
With a theoretical framework of nation-branding and a digital ethnographic methodology 
to aid the phenomenological analysis of the proliferation of Akhmat-Sila, I have sifted through as 
much information as possible for the scope of this thesis to come up with findings that could lead 
to a more expansive and comprehensive study on the subject in the near future by other scholars. 
After reviewing much of the visual and textual data found on Instagram and supporting sources, 
picking the sources best able to define the slogan Akhmat-Sila, its original significance grew 
much wider and prevalent in use, thus developing into Ramzan Kadyrov’s contemporary 




textual signs that circulate in Chechnya, such as Za Kra, pekhota kra, and 95 within the 
leadership, fight club members, armed forces members and supporters, but to sainthood and 
memorialization of his late father, Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov.  
Akhmat-Sila to many but not all Chechens signifies a historical period of turmoil that 
they have climbed out of to reach new heights that many could not have dreamed of before. 
Historically an egalitarian society that placed importance on freedom, Kadyrov’s Akhmat-Sila 
signifies a new Chechnya where expedient social mobility is possible in a narrative that has been 
historically accepted, the hero in local warrior culture, the Chechen Djigit.284 However, Kadyrov 
exchanges the traditional Chechen meaning of freedom of political independence expressed in 
Russian literature or the First Chechen War for a modern, realistic one that focuses on financial 
security, social mobility, safety, and regime loyalty. Kadyrov provides two avenues that fit this 
locally revered historical image while maintaining control over his patronaged: joining one of his 
fight clubs or helping manage events,  and or enlisting in his security forces to support his 
regime. This patronage is not only provided for ethnic Chechens, but to anyone willing to push 
his branding onto the international platform; such as UFC and Boxing celebrities such as Tyson, 
Mayweather, Chechens out of the region such as Khamzat Chimaev, or fighters new to the sport 
or those looking for a sponsor to eventually enter the UFC, such as Georgian-born Liana Jojua.  
This patronage that Kadyrov delves out is not only used for people, but for infrastructure. 
Akhmat-Sila began to appear on infrastructure, from combat-sport training centers, to special 
operation training centers, to airports, to the renovated entry arch to Grozny and most recently, a 
massive holographic image in Dubai on the Burj Khalifa, demonstrating its proliferation. Not 
only does this slogan act as a watermark on all new buildings with the slogan inscribed on it, 
                                               




Akhmat-Sila signals to all who is the leader initiating the project, even though the funds come 
directly from Moscow. For the holographic image, it demonstrates that wealthy countries 
acknowledge the image of Akhmat-Hadji and the slogan. For foreigners and visitors to Grozny, 
the slogan will be their first inquiry upon exiting the airport and driving into town.  To those who 
know what Akhmat-Sila means, will see it as the branding of an era. Others critical of the slogan 
will see it as an era of oppression. 
In conclusion, Akhmat-Sila means a few things that are difficult to put into one sentence. 
The main significance of the slogan is that Akhmat-Sila is a constant reinforcement of Kadyrov’s 
control of Chechnya in the digital and physical space. The slogan serves in a viral capacity, 
easily spread and hard to get rid of once it becomes an utterance in Chechen popular culture. 
Socially, the slogan serves as a social elevator. Any person who uses the slogan can be 
guaranteed protection in a dispute in Kadyrov’s Chechnya and comfortable living in regime 
controlled organizations. To dissidents abroad, the slogan signifies that they are powerless to 
criticize as long as they have family in the region, even on social media. Politically, the slogan 
brings legitimacy to the regime, linking the slogan to famous fighters, fight clubs, heads of state, 
luxury items, and warp-speed infrastructure development. Religiously, the slogan is a moniker 
for the new religious identity, one that praises Akhmat a little more than Allah. Culturally, the 
slogan serves as a vehicle to the new Chechen identity that is a resemblance of the past, in 
mutated form to serve the regime in a larger but quieter Russian narrative.  
Limitations 
 
In the scope of this research during the Covid-19 pandemic, we had affordances that have 
allowed us to explore what Akhmat-Sila means in different aspects of Kadyrov’s Chechnya 




were not explored in this research, primarily because interviewing an inhabitant who is currently 
in Chechnya could be, one, potentially dangerous for the individual, or two, they will not delve 
into any information that is reserved for Chechen society. A culture of silence may always be an 
obstacle to someone who does not have an inside link to the region.  
For now, any criticism of Kadyrov or Akhmat-Sila must be taken from those who wish to 
disclose it publicly online. An interview with someone outside the government establishment 
would enrich the conversation, but may need to come from a Chechen in the diaspora in the 
future. An offline in-person component was not included due to the hostilities and challenges 
academics and journalists face visiting to conduct research in the region. MMA training was an 
option before the December 2020 U.S. sanctions, which now is out of the question for 
Americans. In addition, an in-person component was never part of the scope. Data loss from U.S. 
sanctioned accounts also proved to be an obstacle, although thanks to Chechen Instagram 
culture, re-circulation of posts from the original accounts helped mitigate data lost on original 
Kadyrov and entourage accounts.  
Due to the massive amounts of circulating data, it is nearly impossible to include 
everything and keep up with events that would enhance the research in a hyper-digitized world. 
Kadyrov and some of his entourage use Telegram, VK, and possibly Tik-Tok although this is not 
verified yet. These would be other social media platforms to explore and may be easier to 
navigate. These other social media platforms were not explored in this thesis and were not the 
focus, primarily to keep the work from extending into a Kissinger-sized manuscript. Another 
area that needs work is Chechen language translation of colloquialisms. They are prevalent in 
more traditional postings and would be an interesting aspect. However, without a reliable 




study of its own. So say the least, this study of Akhmat-Sila will provide a basis to all who find a 
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